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POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
There is a hole at the heart of equal protection law. According to longestablished doctrine, one of the factors that determines whether a group is a
suspect class is the group’s political powerlessness. But neither courts nor
scholars have reached any kind of agreement as to the meaning of
powerlessness. Instead, they have advanced an array of conflicting conceptions:
numerical size, access to the franchise, financial resources, descriptive
representation, and so on.
My primary goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political
powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I propose is this: A
group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are less likely to
be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups. I arrive at this
definition in three steps. First, the powerlessness doctrine stems from Carolene
Products’s account of “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities.” Second, “those political processes” refer to pluralism, the
idea that society is divided into countless overlapping groups, from whose
shifting coalitions public policy emerges. And third, pluralism implies a
particular notion of group power—one that (1) is continuous rather than binary;
(2) spans all issues; (3) focuses on policy enactment; and (4) controls for group
size; and (5) type. These are precisely the elements of my suggested definition.
But I aim not just to theorize but also to operationalize in this Article. In the
last few years, datasets have become available on groups’ policy preferences at
the federal and state levels. Merging these datasets with information on policy
outcomes, I am able to quantify my conception of group power. I find that blacks,
women, and the poor are relatively powerless at both governmental levels; while
whites, men, and the non-poor wield more influence. These results both support
and subvert the current taxonomy of suspect classes.
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INTRODUCTION
A week into the 2010 trial over California’s Proposition 8 (which banned
same-sex marriage in the state), political scientist Gary Segura took the stand for
the plaintiffs.1 For the next two days, he testified about gays’2 political power.3 It
was quite low, in his view.4 Very few openly gay individuals held elected office.5
Survey respondents felt less warmth toward gays than toward almost any other
group.6 Gays were the most frequent victims of hate crimes.7 They also were the
1
See Transcript at 1522, Perry v. Schwartzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292
VRW) [hereinafter Perry Transcript]; see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 937, 943, 945, 951-52 (discussing
Segura and Miller’s testimony).
2
For the sake of brevity, I use “gay” throughout the Article as shorthand for “gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transgender” and “homosexual.”
3
See Perry Transcript at 1522-1881.
4
See id. at 1646 (“I conclude that gays and lesbians lack the sufficient power necessary to protect
themselves in the political system.”).
5
See id. at 1556 (less than 1% of local, state, and federal officials are openly gay).
6
See id. at 1563 (average warmth score of 49.4 toward gays was 15-20 points lower than average scores
toward blacks and Hispanics).
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most frequent targets of hostile ballot initiatives, which succeeded more than
70% of the time.8 And discriminatory policies in areas such as adoption,
employment, and marriage were in force in a majority of states.9
On the trial’s tenth day, another political scientist, Kenneth Miller, took the
stand for the defense.10 Miller also testified for two days about gays’ political
power.11 But, unlike Segura, he concluded that it was substantial.12 Gays raised
and spent large sums of money in salient campaigns (like the one against
Proposition 8).13 They enjoyed access to powerful lawmakers.14 Their allies
included Democratic officeholders at all levels, organized labor, many
corporations, and the media.15 Candidates endorsed by gay rights groups
prevailed at the polls more often than not.16 And anti-discrimination laws, hate
crime penalties, and domestic partnership benefits existed in several states.17
Why did Segura and Miller focus so keenly on gays’ political clout?18 The
answer is that, under hornbook equal protection law, a group’s political
powerlessness is one of several factors that bear on whether the group is a
suspect class entitled to heightened judicial protection.19 If gays are a suspect
class, then laws that discriminate against them, such as bans on same-sex
marriage, are subject to more rigorous scrutiny. But if gays are not a suspect
class, then laws targeting them must survive only rational basis review. Political
powerlessness matters because it helps determine suspect class status.
More importantly for present purposes, why did Segura and Miller cite so
many different conceptions of political influence—the number of gays in office,
feeling thermometer scores, hate crime statistics, money deployed in elections,
alliances with other groups, the fate of endorsed candidates, and so forth?20 The
explanation is not verbosity. Rather, it is the Supreme Court’s conflicting and
atheoretical pronouncements about what it means by powerlessness. At different
times, the Court has referred to a group’s numerical size, its access to the
franchise, its level of descriptive representation, its financial resources, and the
enactment of policies protecting it, as the essence of political strength.21 On none
7

See id. at 1880 (gays are victims of more than 70% of hate-inspired murders).
See id. at 1552 (success rate of anti-gay initiatives was close to 100% in marriage area, and about 70% in
other areas).
9
See id. at 1545 (29 of 50 states lack any anti-discrimination provisions for gays).
10
See id. at 2414.
11
See id. at 2414-2715.
12
See id. at 2480 (“I see sort of a trajectory of increasing success and power by the LGBT-rights
movement.”).
13
See id. at 2438 (opponents of Proposition 8 raised and spent $43 million).
14
See id. at 2448-53.
15
See id. at 2455-68.
16
See id. at 2470-71 (59 of 62 candidates by Equality California won in 2008).
17
See id. at 2478-79.
18
Impressively, more than 600 of the trial’s 3000 or so transcript pages were devoted to the issue of gays’
political power.
19
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973) (one of “traditional indicia
of suspectness” is whether group is “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
20
See supra notes 5-9, 13-17.
21
See infra Section I.A. The lower courts have been even less consistent in their analyses of
powerlessness. See id.
8
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of these occasions has the Court sketched any kind of theory that might explain
why power should be understood one way rather than another.22
Nor have scholars stepped into the breach. They have added a few candidates
to the definitional mix—whether a group’s agenda is supported by public
opinion, whether a group succeeds in repealing adverse legislation, whether a
group is socioeconomically advantaged, etc.—but have failed to arrive at
anything resembling a consensus.23 They also have failed to provide much
theoretical ballast for the powerlessness doctrine. The point that a group can be
deemed powerless only if we have an account of what power is for equal
protection purposes seems largely to have been missed.24
This conceptual confusion is both surprising and troubling. It is surprising
because, forty years after the factor was introduced,25 one might expect courts
and scholars to have worked out what powerlessness means and how it relates to
democratic theory. And the trouble with the current state of affairs is that it
produces scenes like the one in the Proposition 8 trial: rival experts testifying for
days about what power might or might not entail, neither having any reason to
privilege any one definition over any other.26 This is no way for law to operate.
Litigants, judges, and academics alike need guidance in determining how much
influence a group enjoys—and so whether the case for extra judicial attention is
bolstered or undercut. Without such guidance, the hole at the heart of equal
protection law will remain.
My first goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political
powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I recommend is as
follows: A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are
less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups.
Where does this definition come from? A multistage argument explains its
provenance (and its content).
First, the powerlessness factor stems from the third paragraph of Carolene
Products’s famous fourth footnote.27 In relevant part, this paragraph states that
“more searching judicial inquiry” may be needed when the “operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” is
“curtail[ed].”28 It states, that is, that heightened scrutiny may apply when a
minority wields less power than it would if the political system were functioning
properly. Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is,
in a word, pluralism. If innumerable groups endlessly are forming and breaking
22

See id.
See infra Section I.B.
24
See id.
25
The Court’s first reference to political powerlessness came in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973).
26
Similar scenes unfolded in the proceedings in, among others, Pedersen v. Office of Personal
Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327-32 (D. Conn. 2012) (discussing expert testimony on gays’ political
power), Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 518586, at *11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (same), and Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 425-26 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
27
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
28
Id.
23
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alliances as they jockey for advantage, then each group sometimes will find itself
in the majority. No group will be a perennial loser if the winning coalition is
reshuffled on each issue. And third, pluralism does not always work as intended.
Sometimes a group is unable to cut deals with its counterparts, and so ends up
being outvoted on item after item. It is precisely in this situation, when a group
loses unexpectedly often, that the group is relatively powerless.
The pluralist roots of powerlessness account for each element of my
proposed definition. Why deem the enactment of preferred policies the crux of a
group’s power? Because pluralism promises each group a chance to win, not
merely to play the game. Why consider policies in the aggregate rather than
individual issues? Because no group in the pluralist competition is entitled to
prevail on any particular matter. Why control for a group’s size when assessing
its power? Because size matters; all else being equal, a larger group is more
likely to end up in the majority. Why also control for classification type? To
avoid comparing apples (e.g., the political power of gays) to oranges (e.g., that of
blacks). And why conceive of powerlessness as a matter of degree? For the sake
of accuracy. Power waxes and wanes; it does not turn on and off.
As soon as powerlessness is linked to pluralist theory, it becomes clear why
other definitions of the term are flawed. If policy enactment is the essence of
power, then a verdict of powerlessness cannot be avoided simply because a
group’s members are free to vote, are affluent, or are descriptively represented
(to name some prominent alternatives). Participation, affluence, and
representation undoubtedly are correlated with policy enactment. But they are no
guarantee of it, and it is winning that matters under pluralism, not exhibiting
some common traits of winners. Similarly, the passage of measures protecting a
group (such as anti-discrimination laws) is not proof that the group is strong
enough that judicial involvement is unnecessary. It remains possible that the
group loses on most other matters. Individual victories might conceal aggregate
defeats.
In addition to defining powerlessness, I aim in this Article to begin grappling
with the fascinating conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional issues that it
implicates. Several of these issues are meaty enough to warrant papers of their
own, so my discussion necessarily is suggestive rather than dispositive. In the
interest of space, I also flag only three of the issues now, and leave the rest for
later.
First, does it matter what the reason is for a group’s powerlessness?
Carolene asserted that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” is the
principal cause of pluralist malfunction.29 But scholars have subjected this claim
to withering critique,30 while also identifying many other factors that may
account for a group’s lack of influence: its diffuseness and anonymity, its low
level of civic engagement, its dearth of resources, its support for a losing political
party, and so on.31 So what happens if a group is powerless but not for the reason
29

Id.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
31
See infra Section II.C.1.
30
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that Carolene envisioned? My tentative answer is that the case for heightened
scrutiny should remain intact. There still has been a pluralist breakdown even if
the breakdown is attributable to other causes. Indeed, the powerlessness doctrine
should be commended for transcending Carolene’s “bad political science”32—for
focusing on the reality of malfunction rather than its explanation.
Second, is it possible to reconcile the inquiry into powerlessness with the rest
of equal protection law? The Court has made clear that it subscribes to an antidifferentiation theory that subjects to more stringent review laws that distinguish
among people on certain grounds.33 But powerlessness sounds not in antidifferentiation but rather in its great rival, anti-subordination.34 To ask if a group
lacks political influence is close to asking if the group is politically subordinated.
In fact, to talk of classes at all (instead of classifications) is to venture onto thin
legal ice. This tension is very real, and it may mean that the Court someday will
eliminate the powerlessness factor. For the time being, though, the factor’s
continued existence suggests that the Court’s embrace of the anti-differentiation
theory is incomplete. Apparently, the Court cannot bring itself (as the theory
would require) to excise politics entirely from its equal protection analysis.
And third, are courts even capable of telling whether a group is powerless?
Under my definition, courts would need to assess the likelihood that a group’s
aggregate policy preferences will be enacted, controlling for the group’s size and
type. Is this a feasible judicial inquiry? Or, as Justice Powell once wrote about
another of the factors relevant to suspect status, a history of discrimination, is
there “no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit ‘heightened
judicial solicitude’ and which would not”?35 I think there is a principled basis for
measuring groups’ political power, and my final goal in this Article is to
substantiate this claim empirically.
I try to do so, first, by surveying the existing political science literature.
Scholars have found, for example, that blacks and Hispanics are less likely than
whites to have their preferences heeded with respect to levels of federal
spending.36 The voting records of members of Congress also are less responsive
to blacks’ and Hispanics’ views, even taking group size into account.37 Both
members of Congress and state representatives are less responsive to the opinions
of the poor as well, again controlling for group size.38 The poor have less sway
too over federal and state policy outcomes.39 On the other hand, women are
32

Ackerman, supra note 30, at 743.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“It
is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”). I call this theory “anti-differentiation” rather than
“anti-discrimination” or “anti-classification” to avoid confusing it with anti-discrimination laws or suspect
classifications.
34
The canonical work on the anti-subordination theory remains Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976).
35
Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 (1978) (plurality opinion).
36
See infra Section III.A.
37
See id.
38
See infra Section III.D.
39
See id.
33

Political Powerlessness

6

almost as ideologically close to their House members as are men (though gender
proximity does vary by member party).40 And while there is little survey data on
gays’ own preferences, it takes more than majority support in the whole
population before pro-gay policies are likely to become law.41
Alas, while very interesting, most of the existing literature is deficient for my
purposes. The problem is that little of it both examines policy enactment and
controls for group size. For instance, the work on minority preferences and
federal spending ignores the magnitude of each minority group. So does the work
on the adoption of pro-gay policies, while also considering just a handful of items
instead of the entire issue universe. And all of the studies of legislators’
responsiveness and proximity to their constituents pertain to representation,
which has only a tenuous link to actual policy.
I thought it necessary, then, to carry out my own empirical analysis to show
that powerlessness is amenable to measurement. At the federal level, I obtained
access to a database recently compiled by Martin Gilens that includes responses
to more than 2,000 survey questions over the 1981-2006 period, as well as
information on whether the policy asked about by each question was enacted
during the ensuing four years.42 Using this data, I replicated the models that
Gilens ran for different income groups, but for different races, genders, and
religions. Controlling for group size, I found that whites’ preferences are more
likely to be adopted by the national government than racial minorities’; that
men’s views are more impactful than women’s; and that all denominations’
opinions are about equally influential.43
At the state level, I used exit polls from 2000 to 2010, including more than
300,000 respondents, to determine the average ideology of different groups in
each state.44 I also relied on an index of state policy liberalism, spanning over
200 distinct issues, recently assembled by Jason Sorens.45 These datasets enabled
me to run essentially the same models as at the federal level, only this time for a
wider range of groups thanks to the exit polls’ greater coverage. Controlling for
group size, I again found that state policy outcomes are more responsive to the
preferences of whites and men than to those of racial minorities and women.46 I
also found that policy outcomes are more responsive to the wealthy and the
middle-class than to the poor; more responsive to urban and suburban residents

40

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
42
See Economic Inequality and Political Representation, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.russellsage.org/research/data/economic-inequality-and-political-representation (last visited Feb. 1,
2015). The book that Gilens wrote based on this data is one of a handful of studies directly measuring
powerlessness (as I define it). See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
43
See infra Section IV.A.
44
The Roper Center generously gave me access to its state exit poll archive. See State Election Day Exit
Polls 1978-2010, ROPER CTR. PUB. OPINION ARCHIVES, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/common/
state_exitpolls.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Exit Poll Database].
45
See Data, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.statepolicyindex.com/the-research/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Sorens Database].
46
See infra Section IV.B.
41
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than to rural dwellers; and about equally responsive to all age, education, and
religion groups.47
These results are good evidence that powerlessness can be measured reliably.
The consistency of the federal and state analyses, despite the use of completely
different data, is especially encouraging. But the results are not just
methodologically significant. They also assist in answering the crucial
substantive question of which groups should be deemed suspect classes. The case
for racial minorities and women—groups already recognized by the Court48—
becomes stronger given their meager influence on policy enactment. The case
against heightened protection for any age groups (also a result consistent with
Court precedent49) becomes more persuasive as well. But, at least on grounds of
clout, the poor have a compelling claim to suspect status. Their policy
preferences are less likely to be realized than those of other income groups, at
both the federal and state levels. The Court’s holdings to the contrary50 are in
tension with political reality.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the conceptual
confusion that mars the powerlessness doctrine. This confusion is evident in both
judges and academics, and stems from their failure to connect the doctrine to its
pluralist roots. In Part II, the Article’s theoretical core, I offer a definition of
powerlessness that is derived explicitly from pluralist theory. I also criticize other
definitions and begin coming to terms with the doctrine’s many intriguing
implications. In Part III, I examine the existing empirics on powerlessness. While
there are several helpful studies, most of the literature does not directly capture
the concept. Finally, in Part IV, I conduct my own empirical analysis of
powerlessness. Using a series of recently compiled datasets, I show that
powerlessness indeed can be measured and then usefully applied.
Two last introductory points: First, as important as what this Article does is
what it does not do. I do not provide an account of how powerlessness relates to
the ultimate determination of suspect class status (though I note some
possibilities). I also do not advance a general model of equal protection (though I
do not hide my theoretical preferences). My more modest aims are simply to
define powerlessness sensibly and then to apply my definition empirically. These
strike me as quite enough for a single project.
And second, the powerlessness factor is not some dusty relic of the New
Deal or Warren Courts. Rather, its legal significance has never been greater than
it is today. Of all the cases ever to analyze it, close to half have been decided
since 2000.51 The vast majority of scholarship on the subject has been published

47

See id.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(race). However, as explained later, the case for blacks is substantially stronger than that for Hispanics. See
infra Section IV.C.
49
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
50
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
51
According to a Westlaw search conducted on January 15, 2015, 184 of the 501 cases to examine
political powerlessness date from after 2000.
48
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in the same period.52 And perhaps the most common argument made by
defendants in perhaps our era’s highest-profile equal protection cases—those
involving gay rights—is that gays wield enough influence that courts need not
intervene to protect them.53 There is some urgency, then, to the task of figuring
out what exactly powerlessness is, and who exactly counts as powerless.54
I.

CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

The powerlessness doctrine has been around for a long time. Its underlying
theory was articulated in Carolene, decided in 1938,55 and its explicit
announcement came in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez. “[T]he traditional indicia of suspectness,” declared the Court,
include whether a group is “relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.”56
One might think that courts and scholars would have settled on the meaning
of powerlessness in the forty-odd years since Rodriguez. But one would be
wrong. In fact, as I explain in this Part, judges and academics have offered
widely diverging definitions of group influence, ranging from access to the
franchise to descriptive representation to the passage of protective legislation.
What accounts for this conceptual muddle? As to courts, I think the answer is
their tendency to analyze powerlessness in the abstract, without considering the
pluralist theory from which it arises. As to scholars, the most likely explanation
is their distraction by bigger game, such as whether there should be a
powerlessness factor in the first place.
A. Courts
Since Rodriguez, the full Court or individual Justices have advanced at least
five separate conceptions of powerlessness, all of which have found adherents
among the lower courts. I arrange these conceptions here according to their
stringency, beginning with the ones furthest removed from actual policy
52

I discuss this scholarship in Section I.B, infra.
See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4359059, at *19 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); Pedersen
v. Office of Personal Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (D. Conn. 2012); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865,
882 (N.M. 2013) (“Focusing on the political powerlessness prong is a reasonable strategy for the opponents of
same-gender marriage . . . .”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2010) (“The most popular strategy by
defenders of ‘traditional marriage’ . . . has been that gay people are not politically powerless . . . .”).
54
See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the
Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 16) (“[T]he controversy over the proper measure of
political power is not likely to go away anytime soon.”).
55
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
56
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Of course, it is quite ironic that the
powerlessness doctrine was announced in a decision that was so hostile to its use to provide heightened
protection to the poor. The doctrine’s roots also stretch all the way back to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879). See id. at 306 (noting that African Americans “need[] the protection which a wise government
extends to those who are unable to protect themselves”).
53
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enactment. I also focus on the Court’s reasoning and consign most of the lower
courts’ analyses to the margins.
First, certain Justices have equated a group’s political strength with its
numerical size. In a 1989 case, Justice Marshall argued that the “numerical . . .
supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing upon the level of scrutiny to
be applied,”57 while in a 1996 case, Justice Scalia contended that women cannot
be powerless “when they constitute a majority of the electorate.”58 Several lower
courts have echoed these views in gay rights cases, claiming that gays lack
influence because they “make up only a small percentage of the population.”59
Second, in its cases conferring suspect status to aliens, the Court has treated
the right to vote as the linchpin of political power. Aliens allegedly are powerless
because they “are not entitled to vote,”60 “have no direct voice in the political
processes,”61 and are “formally and completely barred from participating in the
process of self-government.”62 Following the Court’s lead, a few lower courts
have emphasized access to the franchise in cases involving juveniles63 and the
poor.64
Third, in a 1973 decision suggesting that gender classifications might be
subject to strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Justices defined power in terms of
descriptive representation.65 Women lacked clout because they were “vastly
underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils . . . throughout all
levels of our State and Federal Government.”66 Several lower courts’ discussions
of gays’ influence have proceeded along similar lines. Typically, these courts
have concluded that gays are powerless due to the “underrepresentation of gays
and lesbians in political office.”67 On one occasion, though, a magazine story
“that one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that there is a charge that
57
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to
blacks in Richmond, Virginia).
58
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014); see also, e.g., Love v. Beshear, 989 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 950 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[G]ays
and lesbians constitute a minority that lacks significant political power.”).
60
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
61
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978).
62
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“Minors cannot vote and thus might be considered politically powerless to an extreme
degree.”).
63
See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that juveniles “lack the right to
vote” and have no “independent voice in legislative decisionmaking”).
64
See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 n.19 (Colo. 1982) (contrasting poor, who
are free to vote, with situations in which “a racial minority group was effectively excluded from equal
participation in the political process”).
65
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
66
Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 514 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing against
Mexican American powerlessness in county where “a majority of the elected officials . . . were MexicanAmerican, as were a majority of the judges”).
67
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013); see also, e.g., Watkins v. United
States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446 (Conn. 2008) (“[O]f the more than one-half million people who
hold a political office at the local, state and national level, only about 300 are openly gay persons.”); Griego v.
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 882 (N.M. 2013).
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five other top officials are known to be homosexual” led to a determination that
“[h]omosexuals are not without political power.”68
Fourth, in a 1996 case, Justice Scalia asserted that affluence is the essence of
influence.69 Because gays “have high disposable income,” “they possess political
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.”70 At least
one lower court has taken the same tack, though it deemed gays a suspect class
after finding that “homosexuals earn an income roughly equal to that of the
national average.”71
And fifth, in the 1985 case that prompted the Court’s most extended
commentary on powerlessness, it stressed the enactment of protective
legislation.72 “[T]he legislative response” to the condition of the mentally
handicapped, which includes a range of beneficial federal laws, “negates any
claim that [they] are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to
attract the attention of the lawmakers.”73 Some lower courts have seized on this
language to deny gays’ claims to suspect status. They have reasoned that gays
indeed are able to attract lawmakers’ attention, as evidenced by the pro-gay
measures that certain jurisdictions have adopted.74 Other courts have paid heed
not just to gays’ victories but also to their defeats. They usually have determined
that the losses outnumber the wins, meaning that a judgment of powerlessness is
warranted.75 And still other courts have broadened the inquiry and asked whether
gays are able to end discrimination against them through the political process.
Their answer most often has been negative, leading to their conclusion that gays
lack influence.76

68
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Sevcik v.
Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d, Latta v. Otter, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4977682
(Oct. 7, 2014) (concluding that gays are not powerless after observing that “[h]omosexuals serve openly in
federal and state political offices”).
69
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (also noting gays’ geographic
concentration and greater preference intensity on gay rights issues).
70
Id.
71
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
72
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
73
Id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a
long list of legislation proves the proposition [that women are powerless] false”); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 375 n.14 (1974) (citing “solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors” as
reason not to deem them powerless (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74
See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990);
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. App. 2007) (noting gays’ “growing successes in the legislative and
executive branches of government”); Andersen v. King Cty., 139 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (citing
“enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and lesbian individuals”).
75
See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 439 (observing that gay “victories are being ‘rolled back’ at an unprecedented
rate and in an unprecedented manner”); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992) (criticizing position that “scattered, piecemeal successes in local legislation are proof of
political power”).
76
See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(“The question is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes over the years; they clearly have.
The question is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrongful
discrimination.”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 444 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009). For a longer discussion of how lower courts have dealt with the passage of some

11

Political Powerlessness

The crucial point about these definitions is that they are entirely inconsistent
with one other. Gays may be a small and underrepresented minority frequently
targeted by hostile legislation (implying powerlessness), but they also vote freely,
enjoy reasonable affluence, and win some policy battles (implying power).
Similarly, blacks seem weak if their population share and income are
emphasized, but quite potent if the spotlight shifts to their access to the franchise,
descriptive representation, and success in passing anti-discrimination and
affirmative action laws. Grappling with these difficulties, lower courts often have
complained that “the Supreme Court has no more than made passing reference to
the ‘political power’ factor without ever actually analyzing it,”77 and that “the
Court has never defined what it means to be politically powerless.”78 Scholars
have bemoaned the absence of doctrinal clarity in similar terms.79
What explains this confusion? Why have courts not settled on a single
conception of group influence? The most likely answer, in my view, is the
tendency of judges steeped in the common law system to apply doctrinal tests
without reflecting much on their origins. Take the Connecticut Supreme Court,
whose 2008 disquisition on powerlessness remains the most detailed and
thoughtful of any judicial body.80 The court began by noting that powerlessness
need not be absolute since blacks and women, both suspect classes, have at least
some political clout.81 The court then announced its definition of powerlessness:
“whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the
prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.”82 Next the
court recited several factors that convinced it that gays lack such strength: the
intensity of the hostility against them, the scarcity of openly gay legislators, the
limits of the protective measures already on the books, and so on.83 Finally, the
court argued that whatever influence gays wield, it is less than that of blacks and
women, meaning that they too must be deemed powerless.84
Entirely missing from this analysis was any consideration of why the
powerlessness doctrine exists in the first place. The court did not connect the

pro-gay policies, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1381-90 (2011).
77
Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 437 n.17.
78
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893; see also, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Personal Management, 881 F. Supp.
2d 294, 328 (D. Conn. 2012) (commenting on “ill-defined nature of this factor”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 441.
79
See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal
Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 979 (2014); Schacter, supra note 76, at 1392
n.192 (referring to Court’s “pronouncements” on powerlessness as “scattered, scant and inconsistent”); Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753,
1793 (1996) (“[C]ourts have struggled to determine the appropriate indicia of political powerlessness.”).
80
See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-61; see also Schacter, supra note 76, at 1383 (describing court’s analysis
as “most developed and extended”). As I discuss in the Conclusion, infra, Schacter’s explanation for the
doctrinal confusion is different from mine. She thinks political process theory itself is to blame. See id. at 13901402.
81
See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-44.
82
Id. at 444.
83
See id. at 444-52.
84
See id. at 452-54.
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doctrine to Carolene.85 Nor did it mention the pluralist theory that offers at least
one solution to the puzzle of how much influence minorities should wield in a
democracy. Nor did it cite the political process approach associated most closely
with John Hart Ely.86 Instead, the court treated the words political powerlessness
as if they were written in a vacuum, devoid of any theoretical foundation, open to
whatever interpretation judges might give to them. It is no surprise that this mode
of reasoning, repeated by many courts over many cases,87 gives rise to
irreconcilable notions of power. Power is a coherent concept only if it is
perceived through a theoretical prism.
This critique of the Connecticut Supreme Court applies even more strongly
to the United States Supreme Court. In the half dozen or so cases in which the
full Court has examined the powerlessness factor explicitly, it never has linked it
to any kind of democratic theory.88 Instead, the Court has tended to quote the
factor’s language, to invoke one or another conception of influence—and then to
move quickly to other matters.89 It is true that the Court, as the ultimate expositor
of equal protection law, might have reasons beyond common law instinct for
declining to define powerlessness more clearly. It might worry that a crisper
definition (indeed, any definition at all) would push the law in unwanted
directions. I address the potentially unsettling implications of the powerlessness
doctrine later in the Article.90 But next, I turn to the academic literature to see if
scholars have done a better job than courts in ascertaining what the doctrine
means.
B. Scholars
The short answer is no. In their works on powerlessness, scholars mostly
have reiterated the standards already set forth by courts. While they have
tweaked the judicial tests in various ways, they have not come to any consensus
on the meaning of group influence. In fact, almost exactly the same cleavages
that appear in the doctrine are evident in the relevant scholarship as well.
Take a group’s numerical size (the first of the judicial definitions). Owen
Fiss has argued that blacks are powerless because “they are a numerical

85
The court cited Carolene only for the proposition that “discrete and insular” minorities might require
heightened judicial protection. See id. at 439.
86
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
87
For some of the very few court decisions to approach powerlessness from a more theoretical
perspective, see Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D.
Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing pluralist theory), and Dean v. District of Columbia,
653 A.2d 307, 349 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Finally, there is the
question drawn directly from Carolene Products: whether gays and lesbians are a politically powerless
minority.”).
88
See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
445 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
89
See id.
90
See infra Section II.C.
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minority,”91 while Michael Klarman has advocated the opposite conclusion for
women because they are a “slight majority of the eligible voting population.” 92
Or consider a group’s access to the franchise (the second judicial definition).
William Eskridge has contended that after “people of color started voting” and
“women gained formal access to the political process,” “it was not clear what
more a referee Court should do.”93
Likewise, a group’s descriptive representation (the third definition) takes
pride of place in the work of Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey94 and Suzanna
Sherry.95 Sherry has written that “heightened scrutiny would be appropriate” if “a
discriminatory decision is made by a political body in which [a group is]
underrepresented.”96 A group’s socioeconomic status (the fourth definition) is the
core of Kenji Yoshino’s conception of influence.97 Three of his “factors that can
influence a group’s political power” are “the group’s income and wealth,” “its
education level,” and “its social position.”98 And the passage of protective
legislation (the fifth definition) is endorsed by Eskridge in another piece99 as well
as by Marcy Strauss.100 Strauss has put the point nicely: “Political powerlessness
refers to a group’s inability to rely on the legislative process to protect its
interests.”101
Scholars, then, are just as conflicted as courts on the meaning of
powerlessness. How come? As before, I think one explanation is the temptation
(which is not limited to judges) to focus on doctrine at the expense of theory.
Several of the relevant articles dive into definitional issues without pausing to
consider what broader values the powerlessness factor might aim to realize.102
Fiss, supra note 34, at 151 (also citing blacks’ economic condition and prejudice against them).
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 751
(1991) (also noting that women are “fully enfranchised”).
93
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2379 (2002).
94
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action
and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 705 (1991) (commenting that “[a]lthough
political influence is virtually impossible to measure, political representation is not”).
95
See Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust,
and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 123 (1984).
96
Id.
97
See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 565 (1998).
98
Id. (also recommending group’s “health and longevity,” “its freedom from public and private violence,”
“its ability to exercise its political rights,” and “the acceptability of prejudice against the group”).
99
See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 5 (describing political power as group’s ability to “resist or repeal these
unjust discriminatory laws”).
100
See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 153 (2011).
101
Id. For still more conceptions of powerlessness, see ELY, supra note 86, at 152 (arguing that blacks are
not powerless because they supported winning presidential candidate in 1976), Hutchinson, supra note 79, at
1003-04, 1028 (offering definition centered on whether public opinion favors group’s agenda), and Daniel R.
Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 734 (1991)
(claiming that group has sufficient power when legislature “address[es] a group’s concerns appropriately”). And
in a valuable recent addition to the powerlessness literature, Ross and Li have advocated a “more holistic
approach to determining whether a group has political power” that encompasses all of the factors previously
identified by courts. Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 5).
102
See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 1028 (proposing definition based only on various factors that
political scientists have measured); Strauss, supra note 100, at 153 (proposing definition without any prelude at
all). For a notable exception, see generally Schacter, supra note 76.
91
92
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Another reason probably is academic self-interest. A scholar makes few waves
by agreeing with existing positions. Professional incentives encourage
differentiation.103
But the most likely answer, in my view, is simply that the literature has
focused on tasks other than defining group influence. In particular, most scholars
have sought either to assess the normative desirability of the powerlessness
factor, to explain why certain groups but not others are deemed powerless, or to
examine how the factor relates to the other suspect class criteria. Eskridge104 and
Jane Schacter,105 for instance, have argued that powerlessness should be
eliminated as an independent criterion for suspect status. Similarly, Eskridge,106
Schacter,107 and Yoshino108 have observed a paradox by which courts dub
powerful groups as powerless and powerless groups as powerful. And Richard
Levy,109 Daniel Ortiz,110 and Yoshino111 have stressed the oddity of employing
some factors that reflect anti-differentiation theory and others that sound in antisubordination. It is no great shock that a consistent conception of powerlessness
has failed to emerge from such diverse academic projects.
Ultimately, the reasons for courts’ and scholars’ confusion are not terribly
important. The key points are that there is sharp disagreement over the meaning
of powerlessness—and that the disagreement matters because it makes it almost
impossible to tell whether a group does or does not qualify as powerless. In the
next Part, I try my hand at clearing the fog that shrouds this area of law. I try, that
is, to offer a definition of powerlessness that makes theoretical sense, and to
show that other definitions are theoretically lacking.
II. PLURALISM AND POWER
The definition I propose is this: A group is relatively powerless if its
aggregate policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly
sized and classified groups. I explain, first, how this definition stems from the
pluralist theory that underpins Carolene. The theory claims that, in a properly
functioning political system, groups of about the same size and type should have
about the same odds of getting their preferred policies enacted. So if a group’s
odds actually are much lower than its peers’, then the system is not working
properly, and the group is relatively powerless.
103

I am aware that this point applies to this Article too.
See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 20.
105
See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1403 (“[T]he powerlessness criterion might be better conceptualized as
something to be assessed . . . as an aspect of past discrimination . . . .”).
106
See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 17-19.
107
See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1397-1402.
108
See Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme Court, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 527, 541 (2012) (“A group must have an immense amount of political power before it will be
deemed politically powerless by the Court.”).
109
See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 38-52 (2010).
110
See Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“[T]he Court's overall approach to identifying suspect and quasisuspect classifications appears highly schizophrenic.”).
111
See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 563-64.
104

15

Political Powerlessness

I then contend that other definitions of powerlessness are deficient from a
pluralist perspective. The trouble with numerical size, access to the franchise,
descriptive representation, and socioeconomic status is the same: None of these
options zeroes in on policy enactment itself (as opposed to one of its potential
causes). The passage of protective legislation comes closer to the mark. But the
approach still is flawed because it considers only a small subset of all the issues
that make up the pluralist marketplace.
Lastly, I begin exploring the many fascinating implications of the
powerlessness doctrine. As to powerlessness itself, I discuss whether the reasons
for it matter (I think not); and whether influence can vary over time and space
(absolutely). As to the doctrine’s legal fit, I address its relationship to the other
suspect class criteria (awkward); its relationship to equal protection law as a
whole (also uneasy); and the status of the pluralist theory on which it rests
(questionable). And as to the courts that are responsible for implementing the
doctrine, I comment on their capacity to do so given their political and
psychological constraints (comparatively high); and their ability to determine
powerlessness in the first place (improving).
A. From Theory to Meaning
The case for my proposed definition of powerlessness has several steps.
Below, I go through these steps and then show how each element of the
definition follows from pluralist theory.
1. Pluralist Hopes and Fears
The first key point about the powerlessness factor is that it is derived
explicitly from the third paragraph of Carolene’s legendary fourth footnote. If
“those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” are
“curtail[ed],” then minorities have less influence than they would if the
“processes” were operating properly.112 They are relatively powerless compared
to the “ordinar[]y” situation in which their interests are “protect[ed].”113 This
linkage occasionally has caught the Supreme Court’s eye.114 It also has been
recognized by several scholars. Yoshino, for example, has observed that “[t]he
conventional wisdom that courts should not protect groups with sufficient
political power dates back [to Carolene].”115

112

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
114
See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S.
1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (connecting concern “for a discrete class’s political powerlessness” to
“the moment the Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine in [Carolene]”); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
115
Yoshino, supra note 108, at 537; see also, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 80 (1999) (noting
that powerlessness factor “flows logically from the Carolene Products rationale for suspect classes”); Levy,
supra note 109, at 38.
113
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Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is, in
short, pluralism. The Court, atheoretical as ever, has never said so outright.116
But pluralism is one of the great theories of American democracy,117 and it was
especially ascendant when Carolene was decided in the 1930s. As political
scientists Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech have written, the approach was
“the central framework of analysis during the first sixty years of [the twentieth]
century.”118 Because of this intellectual dominance—and because it is hard to
come up with other democratic theories in which minorities play a central role—
there is little academic disagreement that Carolene’s “political processes” refer to
pluralism.119 In Edwin Baker’s words, “The image of the democratic process that
is most consistent with [Carolene’s] footnote . . . . is pluralistic democratic
theory[].”120
Third, while there exist several variants of pluralism,121 all of them share the
following core logic: The population is divided into innumerable groups, none
amounting to a majority, by myriad crosscutting and overlapping cleavages. 122
Public policy emerges as these groups continuously compete and bargain with
one another to advance their respective interests.123 The makeup of the winning
coalition shifts from issue to issue as the groups recurrently form and break
alliances.124 It thus is impossible to speak of “majority rule” since there is no
116
Though lower courts occasionally have. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (“All groups are a
minority on specific issues, and thus all groups must form coalitions in order to obtain beneficial legislation.”).
117
See Bruce E. Cain, Democracy More or Less: The Quandary of American Political Reform 12 (2014)
(referring to pluralism as one of “three major reform traditions in the U.S.”).
118
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN
POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 (1998); see also, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 21 (1960) (describing ascendance of “‘group’ theories
of politics” during “first third of the twentieth century”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust:
Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Protection of Politics, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1610 (2013).
119
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
120
C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (1980); see also, e.g., ELY, supra note 86, at 80 (claiming even more broadly that the
entire “Constitution’s more pervasive strategy . . . can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism”); Ackerman,
supra note 30, at 719 (noting that “generations of [scholars] have filled in the picture of pluralist democracy
presupposed by Carolene’s distinctive argument for minority rights”). Of course, there are other plausible
readings of Carolene (especially its second paragraph) as well. My claim is only that the pluralistic reading is a
common and intuitive one.
121
See, e.g., John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 368, 368-69 (1983) (contrasting conventional “pluralism I” with more pessimistic “pluralism
II”).
122
See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 207 (1967) (noting that “we get a great
confusion of the groups” when “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of planes [representing cleavages] are passed
through the sphere [representing the public]”); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 369 (1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION 508 (1951).
123
See, e.g., BENTLEY, supra note 122, at 260; V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS
165-66 (4th ed., 1958) (“Much public policy emerges from . . . friction, attrition, and agreement among
groups.”); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376, 390
(1952).
124
See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 115 (1963); Nicholas R.
Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 737 (1983) (“In the absence of a majority
preference cluster, political outcomes are brought about by shifting coalitions of smaller clusters.”); Ross, supra
note 118, at 1580.
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single majority that remains constant across areas and over time.125 Instead,
public policy is the product of “minorities rule”—the particular combination of
groups that manages to prevail on a given matter.126
Fourth, minorities usually are protected in a pluralist system because they
usually have decent odds of getting (at least some of) their preferred policies
enacted. True, there is no guarantee that any group will end up on the winning
side of any individual dispute.127 But, as alliances endlessly come together and
then come undone, any group that is willing to engage in “wheeling and dealing,”
in Ely’s phrase, sometimes should find itself in the majority.128 Why? In part
because of sheer chance; in a world of ever-changing issues and cleavages, no
group should be a perennial winner or loser.129 But also because each group
controls valuable resources that give it leverage as it negotiates with its
counterparts—above all, the votes that are needed to assemble legislative
majorities.130 It is for these reasons that Robert Dahl, a leading pluralist theorist,
has claimed that “few groups . . . who are determined to influence the
government . . . lack the capacity and opportunity . . . to obtain at least some of
their goals.”131
And fifth, the pluralist safeguards for minorities do not always work.
Sometimes a group finds itself losing on issue after issue, unable time and again
to break into the majority.132 Chance alone cannot produce such a dismal record;
the flip of the coalitional coin cannot always come out wrong. Persistent defeats
also are possible only if a group’s preferences are distinctive along several
dimensions; otherwise the group’s views would overlap with the majority’s more
often. But if a group does hold unusual positions, it can end up a perpetual loser
in numerous ways. It might be less skilled than its opponents at the cut and parry
of politics.133 It might be the victim of cleavages that are reinforcing rather than
125

ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 128 (1956).
Id.
127
See Lewis F. Powell, Jr, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1982) (“The fact
that one group is disadvantaged by a particular piece of legislation . . . does not prove that the process has failed
to function properly.”).
128
ELY, supra note 86, at 151.
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bazaar”); Cover, supra note 130, at 1296.
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crosscutting.134 Or it might be faced with other groups that steadfastly refuse to
make deals with it.135 If any of these conditions are present, then the pluralist
promise of (at least some) policy success turns out to be hollow.
I doubt that this account of pluralism and group power would strike most
equal protection scholars as especially original. It is, in essence, the argument
that Ely first laid out a generation ago.136 But while the story may be familiar, its
doctrinal implications are not. Next, I show how pluralist theory, if taken
seriously, urges a particular—and quite novel—understanding of the
powerlessness factor.
2. Doctrinal Implications
Recall the definition of powerlessness that I outlined above. It is useful to
divide it into a series of components: A group is (1) relatively powerless if (2) its
aggregate policy preferences (3) are less likely to be enacted (4) than those of
similarly sized (5) and classified groups.137 Each of these elements proceeds
logically from the pluralist vision that animates Carolene.
Start with the point that a group must be only relatively (rather than
absolutely) powerless in order to have a claim to suspect status.138 In a pluralist
system, a group’s likelihood of ending up in a winning coalition can range from
near-zero to near-certain. A group can bargain (or stumble) its way into the
majority anywhere from almost never to almost always. Since a group’s odds of
victory vary along a spectrum, so should any conception of a group’s power (or
powerlessness). It makes little sense to collapse a continuous variable into a
binary one.139
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See, e.g., Ross, supra note 131, at 217.
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A requirement of absolute powerlessness also would be nearly impossible to
satisfy.140 Take a group with distinctive preferences that can neither promote its
views effectively nor ally with other groups (such as blacks in the Jim Crow
South). Even this kind of group occasionally would see its favored policies
enacted, on the uncommon occasions when its preferences overlapped with the
majority’s. The group might lose on the matters it cared about most, but it would
not lose all of the time, on every single item. To insist on complete
powerlessness thus would be to excise powerlessness from the law.
Second, consider the claim that policy preferences should be analyzed in the
aggregate rather than individually. The claim follows from the basic pluralist
premise that no group is entitled to prevail on any particular issue—that on any
single vote a group may or may not manage to maneuver its way into the
majority.141 If this premise holds, then it is illogical to draw broad inferences
about a group’s power from any individual win or loss. To conclude that a group
is powerless (or powerful), one must take into account the full range of matters
over which groups compete—including both live items on the policy agenda and
settled subjects already incorporated into the status quo.142 As Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule have observed, pluralist theory “aggregates across a large set of
laws and finds a democratic failure only if a persistent minority . . . is repeatedly
sacrificed for the benefit of a persistent majority.”143
Another reason to focus on aggregate preferences is that, if a group is granted
suspect status due to its powerlessness, the label applies across the board. From
then on, all laws that discriminate against the group are subject to heightened
scrutiny, not just those arising in certain domains. As long as suspectness is a
wholesale (rather than a retail) designation, then, powerlessness should be too.144
However, just because all issues should be considered does not mean they all
should be considered equally. A group may hold preferences that vary widely in
intensity.145 It may care a great deal about one topic, and very little about another.
In this situation, it is more beneficial to the group, more conducive to its overall
140
See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444 (explaining that if absolute powerlessness were necessary, then
neither blacks nor women would qualify for suspect status); Hutchinson, supra note 79, at 998 (“Complete
deprivation of political power . . . is a difficult, if not impossible, standard to meet . . . .”).
141
See supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1668
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The minority plainly does not have a right to prevail over majority groups
in any given political contest.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
76 (1980) (dismissing idea that “each time any group loses any political battle . . . it may lay claim to the label
of ‘political weakness’”).
142
Settled subjects must be considered because, otherwise, conclusions about group power will be skewed
heavily by the agenda’s inclusion or exclusion of different issues. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two
Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 948-52 (1962) (arguing that agenda control is crucial second face
of power).
143
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(2006); see also e.g., Tushnet, supra note 129, at 1052 (arguing that a group can be powerless “[o]nly if ‘wethey’ distinctions cumulate across issues”).
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See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 97, at 542 (“Because heightened scrutiny follows the classification into
all contexts, it makes sense to require that [powerlessness] also hold across these contexts.”).
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I speak here of groups rather than group members for the sake of consistency with the rest of the
section. Because groups are not monolithic, it also is common that their preferences on certain issues are
heterogeneous. The empirical analysis in Section IV.A, infra, explicitly takes into account this heterogeneity by
using the proportion of a group supporting a policy change as the key independent variable.
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utility, if it prevails on a matter about which it feels strongly than if it wins on a
more trivial point. Notably, pluralist theory asserts that groups often trade their
support on one item for other groups’ backing on other items.146 This kind of
negotiation can arise only if not all issues are created equal—and it implies that
preference intensity should be incorporated into powerlessness analysis.147
Third, the definition’s most vital element is that actual policy enactment be
treated as the crux of political power. This element has been implicit throughout
the above discussion of pluralism. To speak of winning or losing coalitions is to
speak of times when a group did or did not get its preferred policies enacted.
Similarly, if the thesis of pluralism is that legislation emerges from the
bargaining of different groups,148 then the thesis above all is one about policy
outcomes. The judgment reached by Nelson Polsby, another prominent pluralist
theorist, about the most apt “indices of the power of actors” thus is
unsurprising.149 After considering “(1) who participates in decision-making, (2)
who gains and who loses from alternative possible outcomes, and (3) who
prevails in decision-making,” Polsby concluded that “the last of these seems the
best way to determine which individuals and groups have ‘more’ power.”150
But the odds of policy enactment, taken in their raw form, can be misleading.
The fourth element stipulates that, for the odds to be meaningful, the size of a
group must be controlled for. Why does size matter? One answer is that, as a
matter of probability, a larger group is more likely than a smaller one to end up in
the majority on any given issue. It simply accounts for more of the votes that are
needed to pass a bill. Another answer is bargaining clout. A larger group
typically has more leverage than a smaller one because its entry into (or exit
from) a coalition is more apt to confer (or remove) policy control. Controlling for
size thus is “essential to the responsible elaboration of Carolene Products,” as
Bruce Ackerman has put it.151 Without doing so, there is no way to know if a
group’s influence stems from its group identity or its sheer numerosity.
Size, though, is not the only thing that must be kept constant. The fifth and
final element states that group type—such as race, gender, sexual orientation,
income, and so on—also must be held invariant.152 One reason is that group
146
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power is related to group type in complicated ways, so it is only feasible to assess
a group’s clout relative to another group identified by the same classification. For
instance, the power of the bottom income decile sensibly may be compared to
that of the top decile, since the groups share the same size (10%) and type
(income). But it would be far trickier to compare the bottom decile’s power to
that of blacks (a similarly sized group). Race and income are very different
classifications, so it would be unclear what conclusions to draw from any gaps in
influence.
Another reason to control for group type is that people simultaneously can be
classified along multiple axes. Each of us has a race, a gender, a sexual
orientation, an income, and so on. It thus is impractical to compare the power of
groups identified by different classifications because these groups often include
many of the same people. To return to the above example, the memberships of
the bottom and top income deciles do not overlap (at any given moment). But
some people are both in the bottom decile and black. This possibility of
concurrent membership can be addressed only by keeping group type constant.153
Put these pieces together and you have my definition of powerlessness: A
group is relatively powerless if, on the whole, its policy preferences are less
likely to become law than those of other groups of the same size and type. As this
definition is somewhat abstract, I next offer a stylized illustration of how it might
be applied to particular groups and policies.
3. Illustration
Take the category of hair color and make the following assumptions: First,
that there are two equally sized groups, blondes and brunettes. Second, that there
are two policy domains, guns and butter, which, contrary to every economics
textbook, are unrelated to each other.154 Third, that there are two options per
domain, more or less guns and more or less butter.155 Fourth, that blondes
intensely prefer more guns and mildly prefer less butter, and that brunettes mildly
prefer more guns and intensely prefer more butter. And fifth, that the actual
policy outcomes are more guns and less butter.
Now we are in a position to assess relative group influence. Initially, we see
that both of blondes’ favored policies were enacted (more guns and less butter),
compared to only one of brunettes’ (more guns). Taking preference intensity into
account, the disparity becomes even starker. Blondes prevailed whether or not
they felt strongly about a policy. Conversely, brunettes only won on a policy of
objective or subjective, that can be used to divide the population into a discrete number of non-overlapping
groups. See also supra note 137 (defining “group” for present purposes).
153
See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 721 (arguing that “the decisive thought-experiment should involve the
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154
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little value to them (more guns), while losing on the policy they truly cared about
(more butter). Accordingly, we would conclude that brunettes are powerless
relative to blondes; despite being equally numerous, their views are less likely to
become law, even on the issue that matters to them most.
Of course, groups of the same type seldom have the same population,
meaning that controls for size usually must be added to the analysis. There also
are many more than two policy domains and many more than two options per
domain, making it difficult to ascertain group preferences and policy
outcomes.156 And group members often disagree with one another and differ in
the intensity of their views. These internal variations must be incorporated too
into any estimation of overall group opinion.
Nevertheless, the basic definitional point should be clear now. Pluralism
requires a comparison of groups’ records of getting their preferred policies
enacted. A group is powerless, in pluralist terms, if its record is worse than those
of its similarly sized and classified peers. What does this logic mean for the other
notions of powerlessness that have been suggested by courts and scholars?
Below, I comment on their deficiencies from a pluralist perspective.
B. Power Through Other Prisms
To begin with, four common definitions of group influence—numerical size,
access to the franchise, descriptive representation, and socioeconomic status157—
share the same flaw.158 All of them conceive of power in terms other than actual
policy enactment. True, a group’s preferences are more likely to be converted
into law, ceteris paribus, if the group is large, free to vote, represented by its own
members, or affluent. In fact, I previously explained why numerical size is such
an important determinant of policy success that the latter can be analyzed
properly only by controlling for the former.159 But neither numerical size, nor any
of the three candidates grouped with it, are equivalent to policy success. At best,
they are some of its drivers: factors that make it more likely, but not certain, that
a group’s preferences will be heeded.
Ely has made this point nicely with respect to access to the franchise and
descriptive representation. “If voices and votes are all we’re talking about . . .
other groups may just continue to refuse to deal, and the minority in question
may just continue to be outvoted.”160 In other words, a group’s odds of passing
its preferred policies may be too low even if the group is enfranchised and
156
Furthermore, different policy domains often are linked, and it is hard not to pay more attention to the
status quo than to other policy options.
157
See supra Part I (presenting these conceptions of group power).
158
I do not mean to be too critical of these definitions. They all are correlated with actual policy
enactment, which is no small thing. They also are consistent with important democratic values such as civic
participation, proportional representation, and social egalitarianism. They just are not consistent with the
particular democratic theory, pluralism, on which Carolene is based.
159
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160
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represented by its own members. A district court in Connecticut has offered a
similar rebuttal to the argument that gays are politically powerful because they
wield “‘corporate power’” and control “‘significant sums of money.’” 161 There is
“no authority or evidence demonstrating that this ‘corporate power’ has effected
appreciable socio-economic or political change,” and “despite these sums raised,
gay men and lesbians are still unable to impact the outcome of legislative
processes.”162 Affluence, that is, does not necessarily translate into legislative
victory.163
The last proposed definition of group influence—the passage of protective
legislation164—improves substantially on the previous four. It indeed examines
what pluralist theory deems the essence of political power, i.e., actual policy
enactment,165 rather than factors that may or may not lead to it. The drawback of
this approach, though, is that it does not cast its net widely enough. It looks only
to the passage of protective legislation, not to the passage of all legislation,
protective or otherwise.166 It thus violates the pluralist tenet that groups’
preferences should be considered in the aggregate, not individually, because no
minority is entitled to prevail on any particular matter.167 It improperly highlights
one small corner of the vast issue universe.
To see why this narrow focus is problematic, suppose that a group is unable
to secure the enactment of a law banning discrimination against its members.
Suppose also that most of the group’s other policy priorities (on taxes, spending,
crime, the environment, and so on) are followed by the legislature. Is it really fair
to say that the group is politically powerless? Is it not more accurate to conclude
that the group actually is quite influential—just not omnipotent? Conversely,
imagine that a group wins the passage of an anti-discrimination law, but loses on
almost every other policy item. The group’s lone triumph, even on an issue it
may care about dearly, cannot possibly transform it into a political powerhouse.
This critique also applies to the more expansive variants of the protectivelegislation definition used by some courts: namely, whether a group is able to
prevent the enactment of laws victimizing it; and whether a group is able to end,
though the political process, societal discrimination against it.168 Both of these
variants should be commended for broadening the inquiry beyond protective
legislation alone. But both remain vulnerable to pluralist attack for not
broadening it enough. The policy set of protective and antagonistic legislation,
relating to de jure and societal discrimination, still amounts to only a fraction of
all the issues that should be analyzed in assessing group power. It continues to be
161
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possible that a group thwarts bills persecuting it and extinguishes societal
prejudice against it while losing on all other matters (or vice versa).
A further objection to the existing notions of powerlessness—albeit a
doctrinal rather than a theoretical one—is that they are difficult to reconcile with
the Court’s suspect class designations.169 Numerical size is a problematic
definition because women are a suspect class despite comprising a majority of
the population.170 The right to vote is inadequate because women, racial
minorities, and religious groups all are enfranchised; while minors (who are not a
suspect class) are not.171 Descriptive representation fails because blacks are
represented roughly proportionately;172 while the poor (not a suspect class) are
sharply underrepresented.173 Socioeconomic status misfires because Asian
Americans174 and Jews175 are protected despite their relative affluence; while the
poor are unprotected despite being, well, poor. And the passage of protective
legislation implies that women, racial minorities, and religious groups (all the
beneficiaries of numerous laws) should not be suspect classes.176
Of course, it is not a fatal weakness that a proposed definition fails to account
fully for current doctrine. Some of the proponents of the above approaches may
well want to modify the Court’s suspect class designations. But if that is their
intent, they have not said so explicitly.177 They also have not acknowledged the
sweeping transformations of equal protection law that several of their preferred
options would entail—in particular, the potential end of suspect status for blacks
and women. In contrast, as I explain later in the Article, my conception of
powerlessness would not result in such radical change.178 It would preserve the
current position of blacks and women (though it also would support the inclusion
of the poor in the ranks of the suspect classes).179 This greater consistency with
existing law is perhaps a minor point in favor of my approach.
169
They are difficult, rather than impossible, to reconcile because powerlessness is only one of the indicia
of suspect status. A group could be powerless but still not a suspect class (or vice versa) depending on which
way the other indicia point.
170
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This concludes my definitional argument, meaning that I could proceed
directly to my empirical analysis of powerlessness. (And readers who are
impatient to get to the empirics are encouraged to skip ahead to Parts III and IV.)
But before attempting to quantify powerlessness, I think it is important to try to
come to grips with the various issues it implicates.180 Next, I sort these issues into
three categories, involving (1) the causes and levels of group power; (2) the legal
place of the powerlessness doctrine; and (3) courts’ capacity to implement the
doctrine. I do not purport to wrestle these difficult matters to the ground, but I do
begin what I hope is a useful exploration of some intriguing and understudied
subjects.
C. Powerlessness in Perspective
1. Causes and Levels
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the powerlessness factor is
whether it matters what the reason is for a group’s lack of influence. In Carolene
itself, the Court offered one potential cause of powerlessness: “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities” that prevents them from enjoying sufficient
policy success.181 Scholars subsequently have criticized Carolene’s hypothesis,
on the ground that discreteness and insularity often contribute to, rather than
detract from, a group’s clout.182 They also have proposed several causes of their
own. For instance, Ackerman has argued that a group’s anonymity and
diffuseness typically sap its political strength.183 Jack Balkin has emphasized the
link between resources and power, claiming that it is asset-deprived groups that
are most prone to weakness.184 Bradley Hogin has made a similar point with
respect to participation: groups whose members are less politically engaged may
suffer at the bargaining table.185 And political scientists have explained how party
coalitions, leadership positions, and institutional structures may shape power as
well.186
180

These issues also could be framed as objections to my definitional argument, to which I now respond.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 723; Strauss, supra note 135, at 1264 (“[M]embers of discrete
and insular groups will in fact exercise greater power than their numbers warrant.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (1985).
183
See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 724 (“[G]roups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ . . . . are
systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.”).
184
See Jack M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 309 (1989) (referring to “the most obvious
cause of all—disparities in political power caused by differences in economic power”).
185
See Hogin, supra note 160, at 29 (focusing on groups’ “chronic quiescence”). At the edge of the
participational spectrum are groups that deliberately choose not to engage at all in the political process (perhaps
the Amish in Pennsylvania or certain arch-Orthodox Jews in Israel). Classic pluralist theory does not
contemplate the existence of such groups, and it may be a bit rich for minorities that intentionally exclude
themselves from the pluralist fray then to complain that their policy preferences have not been heeded.
186
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN R. GROSE, CONGRESS IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND REPRESENTATION IN
WASHINGTON AND AT HOME 55 (2011) (party coalitions); KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN
LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 75-81 (2001) (leadership positions); Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities
and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 156 (2002)
(institutional structures such as direct democracy).
181
182

Political Powerlessness

26

Carolene can be read as holding that the reason for a group’s powerlessness
does matter—and, indeed, must be “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities.”187 Justice Scalia apparently endorsed this view in a recent
concurrence, suggesting that blacks in Michigan are not a suspect class because
they neither are insular nor face prejudice from other groups.188 On the other
hand, the powerlessness doctrine itself, in its classic formulation, makes no
reference to any causes.189 And in a 1982 concurrence, Justice Blackmun asserted
bluntly, “[I]t never has been suggested that the reason for a discrete class’s
political powerlessness is significant; instead, the fact of powerlessness is
crucial.”190 So which is it? Does powerlessness always support a designation of
suspect status, or only if Carolene’s hypothesis is confirmed?
Based on pluralist theory, I think the answer has to be the former. As
discussed above, pluralism fails to protect minorities if their aggregate
preferences are heeded less often than those of groups of a similar size and
type.191 Under this conception of pluralist failure, the explanation for a group’s
relative lack of political success is irrelevant. All that matters is that the group in
fact loses more often than it should, because the group then is not benefiting from
the mechanisms that are supposed to assure it its fair share of legislative wins. To
put the point another way, the promise of pluralism is that each group will end up
in the prevailing coalition as frequently as its similarly sized and classified peers.
If a group does not end up in the majority as often, no matter what the reason, the
promise has not been kept.192
True, there is a certain oddity to pledging allegiance to Carolene’s theory but
not to its text. But the text is tentative rather than sure. “Nor need we enquire,”
wrote the Court, whether its posited cause “may be a special condition” that
“tends seriously to curtail” the usual pluralist safeguards.193 The text also turns

Still another possibility is that a group loses more often than its peers because its policy preferences are,
on net, ideologically extreme and so far from the midpoint of public opinion. This explanation also is in tension
with classic pluralist theory, whose perspective on groups’ interests is distinctly transactional and nonideological. And in its emphasis on the median voter, the explanation seems more consistent with
majoritarianism—which, as explained infra in Section II.C.2, is not a theory that can be reconciled with
pluralism.
187
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
188
See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1645 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor
does [the dissent] explain why certain racial minorities in Michigan qualify as ‘insular,’ meaning that other
groups will not form coalitions with them—and, critically, not because of lack of common interests but because
of ‘prejudice.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asking whether group is
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process”).
190
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
191
See supra Section II.A.
192
For scholars making similar arguments, see Ball, supra note 138, at 1080 (“What engages judicial
protection is a minority’s impotence in protecting itself, whether insular or not.”), and Loffredo, supra note 151,
at 1335 (“Why should the absence of prejudice end the inquiry into democratic malfunction?”). Cf. Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion) (concluding that, in polarization analysis under Voting
Rights Act, “only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the
correlation, matters”).
193
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added); see also Louis
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1982) (noting that
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out to be wrong. Ackerman’s famous argument that discreteness and insularity
usually enhance group power devastated Carolene’s hypothesis, and it has not
been rehabilitated since.194 The oddity of ignoring Carolene’s text thus pales in
comparison to the strangeness of taking it seriously. If powerlessness had to be
produced by prejudice against discrete and insular minorities, it very rarely
would be found. At the same time, the political weakness that does handicap
many groups, caused by anonymity, diffuseness, poverty, alienation, and the like,
would fail to register on the judicial consciousness.
But for my position on causality to be convincing, it is not just Carolene’s
hypothesis that must be rejected, but the need for any reason for powerlessness.
How, then, to respond to Laurence Tribe’s well-known hypothetical about
burglars—a group that presumably lacks political influence due to its
misconduct, but for whom “[s]uspect status is unthinkable”?195 One tack is to
deny the premise. Burglars’ preferences as to the crime of burglary routinely may
be rebuffed (since the crime exists), but it is entirely unclear how often they find
themselves in the winning coalition on other matters. We no more can conclude
from burglars’ loss on the burglary issue that they are powerless, than we can
from other groups’ inability to pass protective legislation.196 A single defeat does
not make a minority a perpetual victim.
The other answer to the hypothetical is that the sky would not fall if burglars
in fact were deemed powerless. For one thing, powerlessness is just one of the
indicia of suspect status.197 None of the other indicia apply to burglars, meaning
that their lack of clout would not give them a very strong claim to judicial
protection. For another, even if burglars did qualify as a suspect class, the only
consequence would be that policies discriminating against them, such as the one
criminalizing burglary, would be subject to heightened scrutiny. But there is little
doubt that these policies would survive the more rigorous examination. In Ely’s
words, “There is so patently a substantial goal here . . . and the fit between that
goal and the classification is so close, that whatever suspicion such a
classification might . . . engender is allayed so immediately it doesn’t even have
time to register.”198
Now shift gears from the causes of group power to its levels. It should be
obvious that a group’s political influence can vary from one period or jurisdiction
to the next. A group might find itself on the losing side of too many policy
footnote four was “offered not as a settled theorem of government or Court-approved standard of judicial
review, but as a starting point for debate”).
194
See generally Ackerman, supra note 30; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 94, at 699 (describing
Ackerman’s argument as “an intellectual tour de force”).
195
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1075 (1980).
196
See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (explaining that passage of protective legislation is
faulty notion of group power because it does not consider aggregate policy preferences).
197
For a more extended discussion of the other indicia, see Section II.C.2, infra.
198
ELY, supra note 86, at 154. To put this point in doctrinal terms, the state has a compelling interest in
condemning harmful practices like burglary, as well as in reducing the actual volume of burglary. A law
criminalizing burglary clearly serves the state’s expressive interest in condemnation, and presumably (though it
is an empirical question) serves the state’s interest in making burglary rarer too.
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disputes in a given time or place. But, in another, the group might prevail just as
often as we would expect given its size and type. The question then becomes
whether legal findings of powerlessness (with the suspect class designations that,
in part, follow from them) should reflect these fluctuations in clout.
In a 1989 case, the Court hinted that they should.199 Faced with a minority
set-aside program passed by the majority-black Richmond City Council, the
Court assumed without deciding that “the level of scrutiny varies according to the
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative
process.”200 Since blacks controlled this particular city’s government, they were
not a powerless group in this location.201 Conversely, in a 1978 case, the Court
sharply criticized the idea that suspect status should differ temporally or
spatially.202 If “judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces,” then there is no
“consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next.”203
Under pluralist theory, it seems clear that powerlessness analysis should be
dynamic. If a group was a perennial loser in another time or place, but is not in
this one, then there is no clout-based reason for the group to enjoy extra judicial
protection. It is navigating the political shoals adeptly on its own, just as
pluralism expects it to. Likewise, if a group won its fair share of policy battles
under other circumstances, but does not do so here, then its claim to suspect
status should not be undercut by its erstwhile successes. The pluralist breakdown
in this setting should not be overlooked because the pluralist machinery operated
smoothly sometime or somewhere else.204
The temporal instability implied by this approach does not strike me as
problematic. As the Article’s empirical sections show, the influence of most
groups does not change very much over time.205 In fact, groups recognized as
suspect classes decades ago, such as racial minorities and women, remain
relatively powerless today.206 And if they eventually were to develop sufficient
sway, then I think it would be appropriate for their privileged legal position to be
rethought. They no longer would have the same need for it, despite their past
defeats.
199

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id.
201
See id. (noting that “[f]ive of the nine seats on the city council are held by blacks”). Similarly, under
the Court’s Section 2 doctrine, a group’s ability to “elect representatives of [its] choice,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b),
may vary temporally and spatially as levels of political cohesion and racial polarization fluctuate.
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See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-98 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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Id. at 298. For other expressions of judicial skepticism about recognizing variations in group power, see
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014), and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407, 502 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting) (“No one has ever suggested—nor do I—that, once
established, a class entitled to heightened scrutiny protection may subsequently lose that status if its political
power grows substantially.”).
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For scholars making similar arguments, see Ackerman, supra note 30, at 734, Eskridge, supra note 93,
at 2379, Fiss, supra note 34, at 155, and Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene
Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 177 (2004) (explaining that pluralist theory “avoid[s] the danger of
tagging any group with the status of a permanent victim—or, equally disturbingly, with the status of a
permanent preferred group”).
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See infra Parts III, IV.
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See id.
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I am more concerned, however, about the approach’s spatial instability. For
one thing, it probably is not feasible for courts to make localized determinations
of powerlessness—to conclude, say, that blacks have enough influence in North
Carolina but not South Carolina, or in Newark but not New York City. For
another, in our complex and multilayered system, it is doubtful that power can be
assessed coherently at a subnational level. If women are politically ineffective in
Chicago, effective in Illinois, and ineffective again in Washington, D.C., for
instance, what is a court to do?207 For these reasons, my provisional view is that
powerlessness should be analyzed with respect to the country as a whole. A
group’s clout at different governmental levels can and should be taken into
account, but a single national answer should be reached at any given time.208
So much, then, for the causes and levels of group power. Next, I discuss the
second set of issues implicated by the powerlessness factor: namely, how it
relates to the other suspect class criteria, to equal protection doctrine in its
entirety, and to the democratic theories that underlie constitutional law. All of
these issues probe the place of powerlessness in our legal system.209
2. Legal Position
Start with the other indicia of suspect status: (1) whether a group has
experienced a history of discrimination; (2) whether a group is defined by an
immutable characteristic; and (3) whether a group is defined by a trait that
typically bears no relation to the group’s ability to contribute to society.210 How
is powerlessness linked to these factors? Unfortunately, the Court has never said.
Instead, it has applied the criteria in what a lower court politely has described as
a “flexible manner,”211 sometimes addressing and sometimes inexplicably
ignoring each element. In Michael Dorf’s stronger language, when courts
consider whether to dub a group a suspect class, “[t]he embarrassing fact of the
matter is that they simply make it up.”212
207
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553-54 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that even if blacks were powerful in Richmond itself, “the numerical and political dominance of
nonminorities within the State of Virginia and the Nation as a whole provides an enormous political check” on
their influence).
208
See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part ) (“[T]he focus on political power . . . has to be national, not local, lest constitutional
rights vary from city to city.”).
209
A related question is how the powerlessness doctrine compares to the chief statutory protection for
minority groups, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A group’s political influence plainly is relevant to
“whether there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group,” which is one of the factors that courts consider in Section 2’s totality-ofcircumstances inquiry. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37, 45 (1986). But Section 2’s key goal is that
minorities be able to elect their preferred candidates in sufficient numbers. This variant of descriptive
representation is quite different from the pluralistic theory that underpins the powerlessness doctrine.
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For examples of courts identifying and then analyzing these criteria, see Windsor v. United States, 699
F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 425-61 (Conn. 2008), and Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 886-96 (Iowa 2009).
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Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 888.
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Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 964 (2002); see also, e.g.,
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 503 (2004) (arguing that suspect class
criteria “suffer from both misapplication and theoretical inconsistencies”).
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If courts were not to make it up, one option would be to prioritize
powerlessness over the other three factors. As explained earlier, there is a strong
pluralist case for conferring heightened protection to a group that loses too often
in the political process.213 This case is not weakened if the group is lucky enough
not to have been discriminated against historically, or if its defining trait is
mutable or sometimes germane to its societal contributions. Even if the other
criteria go unmet, there still has been a pluralist malfunction that requires a
judicial response. Following precisely this logic, as Strauss has noted, “some
courts consider political powerlessness to be the ultimate question and view the
other factors as subissues.”214
This is not to say that the other factors would be irrelevant if powerlessness
became the one criterion to rule them all.215 In certain cases, they could help
illuminate why a group does or does not lack influence. For example, a history of
discrimination, like the “prejudice” cited by Carolene, is one reason why a group
may be less able to bargain effectively with other parties.216 Similarly, as Jeffrey
Roy has argued, immutable traits are more likely to divide society into a set of
stable coalitions, one of which then may extract rents at the expense of the
others.217 These kinds of explanations would not be required under a
powerlessness-centered approach (since it would be the existence of
powerlessness, not its causes, that would be dispositive). But they could add
context and texture to the key judicial inquiry.218
However, there are at least two arguments against ranking powerlessness
above the other indicia. First, while there is a strong pluralist case for judicial
intervention if a group is too politically weak, there is no reason why pluralism
has to be the dispositive theory for suspect status designations. The
powerlessness factor may be derived from Carolene, which in turn may be
derived from pluralism—but the other factors flow from theories of their own,
which cannot be dismissed simply because they are different. The idea of suspect
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See supra Section II.A.
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See Jeffrey A. Roy, Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 BYU L. REV. 53, 87
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This is a good place to note that even if suspect status were based exclusively on powerlessness, the
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status also is not tied as closely to Carolene as powerlessness,219 meaning that the
former does not necessarily share the latter’s pluralist orientation.
Second, prioritizing powerlessness would entail prioritizing its particular
conception of suspect status. But this conception is controversial, and it conflicts
with the understanding embodied in some of the other indicia. More specifically,
powerlessness and a history of discrimination both apply to particular groups and
so imply that classes should be suspect. But immutability and societal relevance
both apply to particular traits and so imply that classifications should be suspect.
The first two indicia suggest that extra judicial attention should be reserved for
blacks but not whites, women but not men, gays but not straights, and so on. But
the latter two mean that all groups defined by race, gender, sexuality, and the like
should be protected—the privileged no less than the disadvantaged.220
I do not believe this conflict can be papered over. Thinking about suspect
status in terms of classes is fundamentally at odds with thinking about it in terms
of classifications. Beyond noting the doctrinal discord, though, I would make one
further point: The fact that courts continue to employ all four criteria indicates
that they have not, as is sometimes supposed,221 concluded that only
classifications can be deemed suspect. There must be something left to the notion
of suspect classes if two of the four criteria see the world in terms of groups
rather than traits. Plainly, the suspect class approach has lost ground since
Carolene’s original group-focused formulation.222 But it is fairer to label the
status quo a stalemate than a rout for the suspect classification side.223
Essentially the same point holds if the level of generality is raised from the
indicia of suspect status to the overarching theories of equal protection. The
powerlessness factor is remarkably consistent with the anti-subordination theory,
which maintains that courts should scrutinize most closely laws that
disproportionately harm subordinated groups.224 Almost by definition, groups
that are politically powerless are politically subordinated too.225 But the antisubordination theory is not the dominant account of equal protection law.
219
The Court began using the terminology of suspect status in the 1970s, in cases such as Rodriguez,
without explicitly linking the concept to Carolene. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973).
220
I am not the first to notice the tension at the heart of the indicia. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 212, at
504; Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“The Court applies both process review and its naughty opposite, substantive
review, at the same time.”); Yoshino, supra note 97, at 563.
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See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (noting “the common assumption that, during the Second
Reconstruction, the anticlassification principle triumphed”).
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The enormous volume of case law on whether gays are a suspect class, see supra Section I.A.,
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(collecting cases).
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political power” as reason why they should qualify as suspect class); see also generally Ruth Colker, AntiSubordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein,
The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
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See Roy, supra note 217, at 78 (“The Carolene Products approach ties naturally to an antisubordination
theory because it focuses on a group’s lack of power in the political process.”).
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Instead, it is the anti-differentiation theory, which requires stricter review for
laws that distinguish among people on certain grounds, that is ascendant.226 The
anti-differentiation theory, like the suspect classification approach, treats all
groups defined by the same trait identically.227 It thus is irreconcilable with the
claim that the powerless, but not the powerful, are entitled to enhanced judicial
protection.
Again, then, the continued existence of the powerlessness factor shows that
the triumph of anti-differentiation over anti-subordination is incomplete. If it
were complete, the Court would not tolerate a criterion that sounds so clearly in
anti-subordination. Nor is the powerlessness factor the only doctrinal outpost of
anti-subordination values. As Reva Siegel has documented, they also persist in
the state interest in diversity, which prizes the participation of marginalized
groups;228 in disparate impact law, which upholds facially neutral policies aimed
at helping minorities;229 and in the definition of racial classification, which omits
certain benign uses of racial categories.230 These further manifestations of antisubordination principles confirm that the powerlessness factor is no outlier, no
artifact of a bygone legal era. The factor bears witness, rather, that the struggle
over the soul of equal protection still rages.
Now raise the level of generality by one more notch, from the theories of
equal protection to the theories of democracy on which much of constitutional
law is built. As I have reiterated, the powerlessness factor is rooted in one
particular democratic theory: pluralism, the idea that when many groups compete
and bargain with one another, no group permanently is excluded from the
majority, and policy approximating the public interest emerges from the
contestation.231 But pluralism is not the only available democratic theory,232 and
it has endured attacks from many different quarters. So what happens to the
powerlessness doctrine if pluralism itself is discredited?
It depends on the critique. Several of the best-known challenges to pluralism
accept its normative premise that it would be desirable if similarly sized and
classified groups were equally likely to end up in the prevailing coalition. They
just allege that this equal likelihood is illusory. For instance, public choice theory
226
See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 221, at 10; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1537 (2004)
(describing the “conventional understanding” that “the Court embraced anticlassification and repudiated
antisubordination”); see also supra note 33 (explaining my reasons for labeling theory “anti-differentiation”).
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See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)
(“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”); Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (advancing “the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups”).
228
See Siegel, supra note 226, at 1539 (explaining that diversity interest includes “ensuring that no group
is excluded from participating in public life and thus relegated to . . . second-class status”).
229
See id. at 1541 (observing that “facially neutral, racially allocative state action that benefits subordinate
groups is constitutionally permissible”).
230
See id. at 1543 (noting that courts uphold “racial data collection” “without characterizing it as a racial
classification subject to the presumption of unconstitutionality”).
231
See supra Section II.A.
232
On the essentially contested nature of democracy, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy,
57 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2004).
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contends that concentrated groups enjoy more policy success than diffuse ones,
because they are better able to organize effectively and avoid free-rider
problems.233 Similarly, E.E. Schattschneider has quipped memorably that “[t]he
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent.”234 Affluent groups, that is, systematically outperform poorer ones.
Crucially, if either public choice theory or Schattschneider is correct, the
implication is not that the powerlessness factor should be discarded. The upshot,
instead, is that pluralism breaks down relatively often, and thus that a relatively
large number of groups lack sufficient influence. This is a rationale for greater
judicial intervention, not for renunciation of the underlying pluralist hope.
On the other hand, other democratic theories amount to rejections of
pluralism all the way down. Take the raw majoritarianism that is implicit in the
second paragraph of Carolene’s fourth footnote.235 If there is such a thing as a
consistent majority—and if its preferences deserve to be followed as a normative
matter—then the conceptual foundation of the powerlessness doctrine collapses.
In a purely majoritarian democracy, minorities are entitled only to lose. Their
repeated setbacks are par for the course, not cause for judicial concern.236
Likewise, consider democratic theories that focus on participation237 or
deliberation.238 It is irrelevant to them as well if certain groups fail to join the
winning coalition with sufficient regularity. Perpetual defeat is perfectly
consistent with extensive civic engagement or enlightened public discourse.
To be sure, these theories contemplate democratic malfunctions of their own.
For a majoritarian, the great fear is that the majority’s views will not be heeded,
perhaps because of problems in the electoral system. 239 For a participatory
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GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971); see also BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 118, at 67 (claiming that with
emergence of public choice theory, “the pluralist perspective was essentially dead”); Saul Levmore, Voting
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Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984) (arguing that
deliberative democracy “is especially at odds with pluralism”).
239
For an argument along these lines, emphasizing the many ways that electoral rules can produce
misalignment with the majority’s views, see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014).

OF

Political Powerlessness

34

democrat, public alienation from politics is the bête noire.240 And for a
deliberative democrat, policy enacted due to “naked preferences,” not publicregarding reasons, is the deepest concern.241 But the key point here is that even if
these malfunctions support judicial involvement, the kind of activity they justify
bears no resemblance to that entailed by the powerlessness doctrine. A court that
intervened to ease the passage of items favored by the majority, to rouse the
citizenry from its dormancy, or to strike down poorly reasoned legislation, would
be operating in a manner entirely alien to the doctrine. Accordingly, if pluralism
is cast aside in favor of another full-blown theory of democracy, the
powerlessness factor must be tossed out with it. The factor cannot survive the
replacement of the pluralist hope with a different democratic aspiration.242
Shifting from the theoretical to the practical, can the factor even survive its
judicial implementation? In other words, are courts actually capable of
identifying powerless groups and then riding to their rescue? These issues of
institutional capacity are the last ones I address in this Part.
4. Judicial Capacity
In a series of recent articles, Eskridge,243 Schacter,244 and Yoshino245 all have
identified an irony at the core of the powerlessness doctrine. In their view, courts
applying the doctrine typically confer suspect status to powerful groups and deny
it to the truly powerless. As Yoshino has put it, “A group must have an immense
amount of political power before it will be deemed politically powerless.”246 One
explanation for this curious pattern is that judges may be as vulnerable to biases
and blind spots as the rest of society. They may be conditioned to respond
favorably to the claims of influential groups and to spurn those of pariahs. 247
Another explanation is that courts may be wary of the repercussions of ruling in
favor of marginalized minorities. In Eskridge’s words, courts that “rile prejudiced
majorities . . . . risk[] a tremendous popular backlash.”248
One response to this alleged irony is that it is largely beside the point. My
main goals in this Article are to define powerlessness in a theoretically sensible
240
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doctrine based on a theory that is no longer widely accepted.
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See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 18 (“[I]f a minority group is totally powerless . . . the Equal Protection
Clause will not protect that group.”).
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See Schacter, supra note 76, at 1399-1401.
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See generally Yoshino, supra note 108. Michael Klarman also has made this point with respect to
Supreme Court intervention generally (rather than the powerlessness factor specifically). See generally
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY (2006).
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Id. at 541.
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way and to measure its levels for different groups. The legal realist claim that
courts do not enforce the powerlessness doctrine properly is not particularly
relevant to these normative and empirical aims. It demonstrates that courts are
not following the law, but it says nothing about what courts should do, especially
if they were given the requisite data.249
This response, though, is not very satisfying. Is implies ought; if courts
inevitably ignore the powerless, there is little point to defining powerlessness
more precisely and imploring courts to stick to the improved definition.250 But I
do not think there is anything inevitable about it. First, as an institutional matter,
courts seem relatively well-suited to implementing the powerlessness doctrine.
Their steady stream of cases exposes them to many unpopular litigants, making it
plausible that they will be more receptive to these parties’ pleas than other
governmental actors. At the federal level, judges also have life tenure, and so are
more insulated than other actors from the political consequences of their
decisions. These characteristics may not make courts attentive to the powerless in
any absolute sense, but they at least should yield comparative advantages.251
And second, as a factual matter, courts do not always reject the claims of
vulnerable groups. The quintessential suspect classes, by most accounts, are
blacks and women. As the next two Parts illustrate, both of these groups remain
relatively powerless because, controlling for size, their preferences are much less
likely to be enacted than those of whites and men.252 Blacks and women may not
lack any influence at all, but this has never been the doctrinal test. Accordingly,
the irony spotted by Eskridge, Schacter, and Yoshino evaporates once a
theoretically suitable definition of powerlessness is adopted.253 By providing
greater protection to blacks and women, courts have proven that they are willing
to grant suspect status to groups that merit it. The courthouse door is not just
open to the powerful.
Willingness to protect the powerless, though, is not the only capacity-related
issue that must be considered. Courts also must be able to tell whether groups
lack sufficient influence. That is, they must be able to distinguish between groups
that enjoy enough policy success, given their size and type, and groups that do
not. And this is not always an easy task. As one lower court has complained, the
powerlessness factor “involve[s] a myriad of complex and interrelated
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This also is my response to the claim that the powerlessness factor—and, indeed, all of the suspect
class criteria—do not matter very much because courts can reach their preferred outcomes regardless of the
level of scrutiny they apply. Even if this claim is correct, it is largely irrelevant to my effort here to get to the
bottom of how the powerlessness factor should be implemented.
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This is why Eskridge and Schacter both urge the elimination of the powerlessness factor. See Eskridge,
supra note 53, at 20; Schacter, supra note 76, at 1403.
251
See ELY, supra note 86, at 103 (arguing that judges are “in a position objectively to assess claims”
relating to “majority tyranny”); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
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See infra Parts III-IV.
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considerations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding.”254 Or as
David Strauss has written, the factor “requires the Justices to be, in a sense,
amateur political scientists. They have to decide just which groups in American
politics are able to form coalitions, and how easily.”255
This concern cannot be resolved through logical reasoning. Only data can
show that powerlessness, as I conceive of it, can be measured and then usefully
applied. The balance of the Article, then, is devoted to this demonstration. First,
in Part III, I survey the existing political science literature on group influence.
Some of it is quite useful (especially the work on the sway of different income
strata), but much of it either fails to control for group size or studies
representation rather than policy enactment. Next, in Part IV, I carry out my own
empirical analysis of powerlessness. Using newly available data at both the
federal and state levels, I am able to operationalize the definition I have advanced
above.256 Together, these Parts establish that, while powerlessness is a complex
concept, it is not impervious to quantification. It thus cannot be dismissed on
grounds of unmanageability.
III. EXISTING EMPIRICS
The perfect study, for present purposes, would assess the odds of a group’s
aggregate policy preferences being enacted, while controlling for the group’s size
and type. A small subset of the literature comes close to this ideal, though only
with respect to income. This work finds that the poor are relatively powerless at
both the federal and state levels. Unfortunately, most of the relevant studies are
lacking in several respects. If they examine policy enactment at all, they tend to
consider only a few issues and not to control for group size. More often, they
evaluate representation rather than the passage of legislation (though, in this case,
sometimes holding size constant).257 While not fully applicable for these reasons,
this work concludes that racial minorities, women, and gays all lack sufficient
political influence.
Below, then, I summarize the existing scholarship on group power. I arrange
the studies by group type, beginning with classifications already deemed
254
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429 (Conn. 2008); see also Regents of Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“The kind of variable sociological and political
analysis necessary to produce such rankings [under the history-of-discrimination factor] simply does not lie
within the judicial competence . . . .”); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (warning that “unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally justify both the terms and
analysis it uses,” the identification of suspect classes will become incoherent).
255
David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1265; see also, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 120, at 1051; Powell, supra note 127, at 1091 (“One reasonably may doubt the capacity of
courts to . . . determine which groups—at a given time and place—operate effectively within our politics.”);
Schacter, supra note 76, at 1392.
256
See supra Section II.A.
257
Another study examines how often different groups of voters cast ballots for losing candidates at all
levels of government. See Zoltan L. Hajnal, Who Loses in American Democracy? A Count of Votes
Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African Americans, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 37 (2009). It finds that
blacks are the group most likely to support losing candidates. I do not discuss this approach further because it
too deals with an aspect of democracy other than policy enactment.
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suspicious by the Court (i.e., race and gender), proceeding to classifications often
urged to be added to the suspect list (i.e., sexuality and income), and concluding
with a pair of additional categories (i.e., age and education). For each study, I
discuss its key findings while also highlighting its limitations.
A. Race
The most important work on different racial groups’ clout has been carried
out by John Griffin and Brian Newman. In their book, Minority Report,258 and in
a series of studies,259 they have investigated both the likelihood that racial
groups’ policy preferences will be enacted and various aspects of racial
representation in Congress. While their methods do not allow them to capture my
notion of powerlessness, their results are still illuminating.
As to policy enactment, Griffin and Newman used long-running opinion
surveys to determine racial groups’ views on whether federal spending should
increase or decrease in six areas: national defense, the environment, education,
foreign aid, aid to major cities, and the space program.260 They then compared the
groups’ views to the changes in spending that actually took place.261 This
approach is imperfect because it addresses only a fraction of all federal activity,
fails to control for group size, and overlooks the extent to which the status quo
already reflects groups’ preferences. Nevertheless, it shows that, on the covered
issues, blacks and Hispanics’ opinions are substantially less likely to be heeded
than whites’.262 Spending on a given item is more apt to decrease when blacks
and Hispanics favor a rise, and more apt to increase when they favor a fall.263
This is probative (though hardly dispositive) evidence that blacks and Hispanics
are relatively powerless.264
As to representation, Griffin and Newman measured racial groups’
ideologies using another major survey,265 and Congress members’ positions using
roll call votes.266 They then estimated the members’ proximity and
responsiveness to their constituents by racial group, controlling for group size.267
258
See JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT: EVALUATING POLITICAL EQUALITY IN
AMERICA (2008).
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See John D. Griffin, When and Why Minority Legislators Matter, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 327 (2014);
John D. Griffin & Patrick Flavin, Racial Differences in Information, Expectations, and Accountability, 69 J.
POL. 220 (2007); John D. Griffin & Michael Keane, Are African Americans Effectively Represented in
Congress?, 64 POL. RES. Q. 145 (2011); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, The Unequal Representation of
Latinos and Whites, 69 J. POL. 1032 (2007).
260
See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 63-64.
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See id. at 64-69.
262
See id.
263
See id. More specifically, blacks are less likely to be “winners” in four of six areas, and more likely to
be “big losers” in three of six areas. Hispanics are less likely to be “winners” in three of six areas, and more
likely to be “big losers” in two of six areas. See id.
264
A study confirming racial minorities’ lack of policy success, in the very different context of direct
democracy, is Hajnal et al., supra note 186. It found that blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans all are more
likely than whites to end up on the losing side of voter initiatives. See id. at 162-63.
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See id. at 82-83 (discussing National Annenberg Election Survey).
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See id. at 81-82 (discussing W-Nominate scores computed using all non-unanimous roll call votes).
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See id. at 96, 104, 107, 109 (presenting charts and models controlling for group size).
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Representation, again, is tied only loosely to enacted policy, and Griffin and
Newman’s size controls were suboptimal too.268 Their results, though,
consistently indicated that black and Hispanic voters wield less influence than
whites over their legislators. House members and senators are farther
ideologically from their minority constituents, irrespective of the racial makeup
of their district or state.269 Similarly, in models including the population shares of
minorities, legislators are markedly less responsive to their views.270 These
findings also support (but do not compel) a conclusion of black and Hispanic
powerlessness.
Griffin and Newman ran several more analyses of representation in which
they made no effort to control for racial group size.271 Christopher Ellis has done
the same in another study.272 Because these analyses deviate even further from
the ideal approach, I note only that they too found that blacks and Hispanics are
underrepresented relative to whites,273 and do not dwell further on their results.
(Later in this Part, in the absence of more relevant studies, I pay closer attention
to work lacking any size controls.274)
B. Gender
Griffin, Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht also have authored the only study
on how representation varies by constituents’ gender.275 As in their racial work,
they estimated constituent-legislator proximity using survey responses and roll
call votes.276 In addition, they computed constituents’ “win ratios” by comparing
their preferences on specific bills to their legislators’ votes on the same items. 277
These techniques, once more, bear little relevance to actual policy enactment and
do not control explicitly for group size.278 But they show that women are
substantially underrepresented relative to men, in terms of both proximity and
268
Rather than include group size as an actual control in their proximity analyses, Griffin and Newman
calculated proximity separately for districts and states in different racial percentage bands. See id. at 96, 104.
They also did not include white population share in their senator responsiveness model. See id. at 107. Their
House member responsiveness model, though, did control properly for group size. See id. at 109.
269
See id. at 96, 104 (showing racial gaps in proximity of five to forty points for districts, and four to
twelve points for states).
270
See id. at 107 (finding that black and Hispanic opinion have impact indistinguishable from zero on
senators’ voting records); id. at 109 (finding that white opinion has impact more than twice as large as black or
Hispanic opinion on House members’ voting records).
271
See id. at 85 (senator responsiveness model); id. at 93 (House member proximity chart); Griffin &
Flavin, supra note 259, at 225-26 (House member proximity model); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at
1032 (same).
272
See Christopher Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and
Policy Representation in the 110th House, 65 PUB. RESEARCH Q. 938, 943-44 (2012).
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See infra Section III.E.
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See John D. Griffin et al., A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?, 37 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 35 (2012).
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See id. at 44-45.
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See id. at 42-44.
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Though they do control for it implicitly since men and women make up about equal shares of the
population. See id. at 37 (“[W]e might also want to know whether two groups of relatively equal size are
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win ratios, when their legislators are Republicans or there is a Republican House
majority.279 In contrast, women enjoy a representational advantage (albeit a
smaller one) when their legislators are Democrats or there is a Democratic House
majority.280 These results suggest that women’s political influence is mediated by
partisan forces. It waxes when Democrats are ascendant and wanes when
Republicans are the dominant party.
Three further studies by Griffin and Newman have presented data on gender
representation while focusing on other matters. They found that, relative to men,
women are more ideologically distant from their House members281 and have
lower legislative win ratios.282 These disparities, which do not take party into
account, are consistent with the above conclusion that women are sharply
underrepresented by Republicans and mildly overrepresented by Democrats.
Modest overall shortfalls seem to mask wider partisan variations.
C. Sexual Orientation
Next, gays’ policy preferences cannot be ascertained in the same manner as
racial minorities’ or women’s. Their share of the population is too small for their
views to be gauged accurately by most surveys, especially at subnational levels.
It thus is impossible to compare their opinions directly with actual policy
outcomes or legislators’ voting records.283 But it is possible, as Jeffrey Lax,
Justin Phillips, and Katherine Krimmel have demonstrated, to assess gays’
influence in other ways.284 These scholars used a cutting-edge technique to
estimate the entire public’s views on various gay rights issues: adoption,
marriage, military service, anti-discrimination legislation, and so on.285 They then
paired these views with policy outcomes at the state level and Congress
members’ votes at the federal level.286 As a result, they were able to determine
how congruent the outcomes and the votes are with public opinion as a whole.
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House majority. See id. at 47-52.
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House majority. See id.
281
See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 94 (showing two-point gap in ideological proximity by
gender); Griffin & Newman, supra note 259, at 1038 (same).
282
See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation, and Disparities in
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This approach, of course, suffers from both its lack of data on gays’ own
preferences and its coverage of gay rights issues alone. Nevertheless, it reveals a
persistent bias, at both the state and federal levels, in an anti-gay direction. At the
state level, most pro-gay policies do not become likely to be adopted until they
are backed by more than a majority of the population.287 In fact, it typically takes
close to two-thirds support before half of a suite of pro-gay policies are passed.288
Similarly, at the federal level, most members of Congress need more than
majority support among their constituents before they become willing to cast a
pro-gay vote.289 Of the many instances in which legislators contravened their
constituents’ preferences, fully three-fourths arose due to anti-gay votes when the
public favored a pro-gay stance.290 Consequently, as Lax and Phillips put it,
“representative institutions do a poor job protecting [gay] rights even when the
public supports the pro[gay] position.”291 This is not quite what I mean by
powerlessness, but it is not too far either.
D. Income
Almost exactly what I mean by powerlessness, though, has been captured by
several income group studies. The most significant of these is Gilens’s 2012
book, Affluence and Influence.292 In it, he compiled answers to more than two
thousand survey questions from 1981 to 2006, all asking whether respondents
favored certain policy changes at the federal level.293 The questions spanned a
wide range of topics and addressed many sorts of shifts to the status quo, in many
sorts of ideological directions.294 Gilens then used the answers to estimate the
preferences of respondents at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth income percentiles
on all covered issues.295 Lastly, he painstakingly tracked whether each policy
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See Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 373 (showing logistic regression plot for index of all eight
policies).
289
See Krimmel et al., supra note 284, at 34 (showing logistic regression plots for various congressional
votes).
290
See id. at 12.
291
Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 383.
292
See GILENS, supra note 42. Gilens also addressed these issues, albeit less extensively, in earlier work.
See Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778 (2005). And he has
continued to probe them since publishing Affluence and Influence. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page,
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (Apr. 9, 2014).
293
See GILENS, supra note 42, at 57-60.
294
In Gilens’s database, the questions are sorted into the following categories: budget, campaign finance,
civil rights, defense, economy and labor, education, environment, foreign policy, government reform, guns,
health, immigration, race, religion, social welfare, taxation, terrorism, and welfare. Because the questions all ask
about policy changes, a group may appear weak if it is largely content with the status quo but prefers a policy
that fails to be enacted. On the other hand, such a group may appear strong if it opposes a policy that ultimately
does not become law. A more sophisticated survey might ignore the status quo and simply ask whether various
potential policies are favored. The answers then could be compared with the policies actually in effect.
295
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asked about by a survey actually was adopted by the federal government during
the next four years.296
This approach is well suited to assessing powerlessness because it examines
policy enactment in the aggregate and controls for group size and type.297 (It is
not flawless, though, because the survey questions did not ask respondents about
the intensity of their preferences.298) The method also produces some fairly
startling results. With respect to issues on which income groups disagree, federal
policy outcomes are highly responsive to the views of respondents at the
ninetieth percentile. As their support for a given measure increases, the
likelihood of the measure’s adoption increases steadily as well.299 But federal
policy outcomes are entirely non-responsive to the views of respondents at the
tenth or fiftieth percentiles.300 In Gilens’s words, “when preferences between the
well-off and the poor [or middle-class] diverge, government policy bears
absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor
[or middle-class].”301
Gilens’s findings at the federal level have been extended to the states by
Patrick Flavin302 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright.303 These scholars used
survey data to determine income groups’ policy preferences—in the aggregate in
Flavin’s case,304 and split into economic and social subsets in Rigby and
Wright’s.305 They also obtained policy outcome information from databases
assembled by Sorens and others (again in the aggregate in Flavin’s case,306 and
subdivided economically and socially in Rigby and Wright’s307). Lastly, they ran
models with policy outcomes as the dependent variables and income groups’
preferences as the key independent variables, controlling explicitly for group
size.308
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This methodology is near optimal from this Article’s perspective (though it
too does not take preference intensity into account directly). And it shows that
the poor have next to no influence over state policy either. In all of Flavin’s
models, spanning three databases and two eras, the preferences of the lowincome group have an impact indistinguishable from zero on aggregate policy
outcomes (compared to significant impacts for middle- and high-income
preferences).309 Similarly, in three out of Rigby and Wright’s four models, the
views of the low-income group have no effect on state economic or social policy
(while middle- and high-income opinions have a substantial effect).310 These
results, in conjunction with Gilens’s, are a clear sign that powerlessness can be
quantified—and that, if any group is powerless, it is the poor.
Several additional studies have tackled differential representation by income
group (most notably Larry Bartels’s 2008 book, Unequal Democracy, which
launched this field of inquiry).311 Their findings are that both House members
and senators are more ideologically distant from, and less ideologically
responsive to, their low-income constituents.312 Since this work does not relate
directly to policy enactment, I do not discuss it further, except to point out its
consistency with the more relevant literature.
E. Other
Two final classifications, age and education, have not yet been the subjects
of full-length treatments, but have been addressed in passing by a number of
studies. As to age, Griffin and Newman found that respondents under thirty-five
are farther ideologically from their House members than respondents over fiftyfive.313 Similarly, as to education, Ellis, Griffin, and Newman found that
respondents with a high school diploma are farther ideologically from their
House members, and have lower legislative win ratios, than respondents with a
college degree.314 Once again, these are analyses of representation rather than
enacted policy, which fail to control for group size to boot. But they still imply
that the young and the uneducated have less political sway than the old and the
educated.
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To conclude, then, the existing scholarship on group influence is suggestive
but only partially applicable. Substantively, it hints that racial minorities, women,
gays, the poor, the young, and the uneducated may be relatively powerless in my
sense of the term. But methodologically, none of these intimations can be taken
too seriously—except as to the poor—because they arise from studies that are
flawed in one respect or another. In the next Part, I try to rectify these
shortcomings. I borrow the best available techniques from the income group
literature, and then apply them to a host of additional classifications and datasets.
The result, in my view, is the strongest proof to date that powerlessness is
amenable to measurement and application.
IV. NEW EMPIRICS
I carry out my empirical analysis at both the federal and state levels. At the
federal level, I use Gilens’s database of survey responses and policy outcomes,
and I largely replicate his work—only for groups defined not just by income, but
also by race, gender, and religion. I find that whites’ preferences are more likely
to be adopted by the national government than blacks’ and Hispanics’; that men’s
views are more impactful than women’s; and that all denominations’ opinions are
about equally influential.
At the state level, I gauge voters’ preferences using exit polls from 2000 to
2010, and enacted policy using an index constructed by Sorens. I then run the
same models that have gained wide acceptance in the income group literature,
including interactions between group opinion and group size as well as additional
group size controls. I again find that state policy is more responsive to the views
of whites and men, respectively, than to those of racial minorities and women. I
also find that state policy is more responsive to the wealthy and the middle-class
than to the poor, and to urban and suburban residents than to rural dwellers. But
there do not seem to be significant differences in responsiveness by age,
education, or religion group.
That there exist models tailored to measuring powerlessness is evidence of
the concept’s workability. Still more encouraging, in this regard, is the
consistency of the federal and state findings despite their use of completely
different data. As a doctrinal matter, the results suggest that racial minorities and
women should keep their suspect status because they remain relatively
powerless.315 Analogously, no age or education group appears so weak that
heightened judicial protection should be extended to it. But there is a strong
clout-based case for suspect status for the poor and for rural dwellers, both of
whom lack sufficient sway relative to other income and residence groups. And
there also is reason to reconsider the extra judicial attention afforded to religious
minorities, none of which is particularly impotent.
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A. Federal Level
As noted earlier, Gilens’s remarkable database includes information on
different income groups’ preferences on more than two thousand issues from
1981 to 2006.316 Gilens used this information, along with records of whether the
policies referred to by the surveys in fact were enacted, to conduct his income
group analysis.317 But his database sheds light on more than income groups’
views. Each entry also specifies how many respondents of each race, gender, and
religion favored the policy, and how many opposed it.318 These tallies allowed
me to compute, for each policy, the level of support of each race, gender, and
religion group.319
With these estimates in hand, I proceeded to run slightly adapted versions of
Gilens’s models. Like Gilens, I used as my dependent variable whether a policy
was adopted by the federal government during the four years following a
survey.320 Also like Gilens, I examined two groups at a time, considered only
issues on which their preferences diverged by at least ten percentage points, and
was unable to adjust for preference intensity.321 But, unlike Gilens, I controlled
explicitly for group size in all of my models.322 I included, for each group, an
interaction term multiplying its support level by its share of the population, as
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See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text; see also GILENS, supra note 42, at 57-60.
See id.
318
Gilens’s database is on file with the author. Each entry also states how many respondents answered
“don’t know.” I omit these responses from my analysis. The database further breaks down respondents by
region of the country and by union membership. Because these are not classifications that have been urged to be
made suspect, I do not consider them further.
319
I simply divided the number of each group’s respondents favoring a given policy by the total number of
the group’s respondents favoring or opposing the policy. For example, if 300 blacks favored a particular policy
and 200 opposed it, black support for the policy was 60%.
320
See GILENS, supra note 42, at 75-85. In sum, about one-third of the policies in the database were
enacted in this timeframe. See id. at 63.
321
See id. at 77-85. Only two groups at a time can be examined since it is the groups’ opinion differences
that determine which issues will be included in the analysis in the first place. And Gilens’s rationale for
focusing on issues on which groups disagree is that, otherwise, a group may appear influential simply because it
agrees with the group that actually shapes policy. See id. at 78. Under my conception of group power, it
arguably is irrelevant that a group’s preferences may have been heeded only because they overlapped with those
of another group. See supra Section II.A. Nevertheless, I adopt Gilens’s approach here for the sake of
comparability with his landmark work. It also makes little substantive difference whether only issues on which
groups disagree, or all issues, are included in the analysis. Either way the results for different groups’ clout are
extremely similar.
322
As noted earlier, Gilens controlled implicitly for group size. See supra note 297. Gilens’s database also
did not include population share information for any groups. I obtained data on race from Population Estimates,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/nat2010.html (last visited Feb.
1, 2015) [hereinafter Population Estimates], and Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on
Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States,
Regions, Divisions, and States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2002), http://www.census.gov/population/
www/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.html; data on gender from Population Estimates, supra, and FRANK
HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Nov. 2002),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf; and data on religion from Subject Index, GEN. SOC.
SURVEY, http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Subject+Index/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2015) (follow links to R, Religion, R’s Religious Preference, Respondent (Current), Rs Religious Preference,
and Trends). Of course, these controls only capture temporal variation in group size, which is substantial but not
overwhelming over the twenty-five year period in question.
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well as its population share separately.323 This is the approach recommended by
Flavin, Rigby and Wright, and several other political scientists.324 It weights each
group’s preferences by its size, while leaving open the possibility that group size
may have an independent effect on policy enactment. It thus permits very nearly
my conception of powerlessness to be quantified.
Beginning with race, I ran separate models for whites and blacks, and whites
and Hispanics. (There were too few Asian American respondents in most surveys
for their views to be determined accurately.325) In the white and black model,
first, the coefficient for white policy support (weighted by white population
share) is positive and statistically significant.326 This indicates that, as white
support for a policy increases, the odds of the policy’s enactment increase as
well. On the other hand, the coefficient for black policy support (weighted by
black population share) is negative and statistically indistinguishable from
zero.327 This means that, as black support for a policy rises, the likelihood of the
policy’s adoption stays constant at best, and in fact may decline somewhat.
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1’s first panel. The chart
shows how the odds of policy enactment change as white support and black
support for a policy vary from 0% to 100%, holding all other variables at their
means.328 As white support increases from 0% to 100%, the likelihood of
adoption increases from about 10% to about 60%. As black support rises from
0% to 100%, though, the odds of enactment fall from roughly 40% to roughly
30%. Federal policy outcomes thus are highly responsive to the preferences of
whites, but wholly non-responsive (or even negatively responsive) to those of
blacks.
The white and Hispanic model yields similar outputs. Again, the coefficient
for size-weighted white policy support is positive and statistically significant.329
More formally, each model I ran was a logit regression of the form: P = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝜋𝑔1 𝜎𝑔1 ) + 𝛽2(𝜋𝑔2 𝜎𝑔2 )
+ 𝛽3 𝜎𝑔1 + 𝛽4 𝜎𝑔2 + 𝜀. P indicates whether each policy was enacted within four years of the survey that asked
about it, 𝜋 is a group’s level of support for a policy, and 𝜎 is a group’s share of the population. It also would be
reasonable to include group preference (that is, 𝜋) separately in the model. However, the existing literature has
not done so, see infra note 324, and I do not either for the sake of comparability. But in results not reported
here, I find that it makes little substantive difference whether group preference is included separately in the
specification.
324
See Flavin, supra note 302, at 41 (specifying same models as those used here); Rigby & Wright, supra
note 303, at 207 (same); see also, e.g., Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor
Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 303, at 223, 230 (same, and also
explaining that groups’ population shares must be included separately in models to avoid odd results);
Tausanovitch, supra note 311, at 11 (same).
325
The median survey included only 10 Asian American respondents, compared to 862 whites, 105
blacks, and 55 Hispanics.
326
All regression results are in the Appendix. See infra appx. tbl.1. I only discuss the coefficients for sizeweighted policy support because the coefficients for group size, which represent its impact on the likelihood of
policy adoption when group policy support is zero, are not substantively interesting. See Bear F. Braumoeller,
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L ORG. 807, 807-11 (2004) (noting difficulty of
interpreting lower-order coefficients in model with interaction term).
327
See id. The coefficient actually is significant at the 10% level, but I use the customary 5% threshold
here. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for white and black policy support are different (p=0.01).
328
It is not possible to produce this chart with size-weighted policy support (i.e., the interaction term in the
models) on the x-axis. This is because group size cannot be held constant at its mean as size-weighted policy
support varies. Group size obviously is part of the interaction term.
329
See id.
323
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And again, the coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic policy support is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.330 As shown in Figure 1’s second panel,
the odds of policy enactment increase from about 10% to about 55% as white
support rises from 0% to 100%. But the likelihood of adoption holds steady at
roughly 30% as Hispanic support varies over the same range. Hispanics therefore
have little sway over federal policy either, in contrast to the considerable
influence enjoyed by whites.
Second, for gender, I ran a single model for men and women. The coefficient
for size-weighted male policy support is positive and statistically significant.331
Conversely, the coefficient for size-weighted female policy support is negative
and significant.332 The inference that federal policy is positively responsive to
men’s preferences, but negatively responsive to women’s, is confirmed by Figure
1’s third panel. As male support increases from 0% to 100%, the odds of policy
enactment rise from about 0% to about 90%. But as female support varies over
the same range, the likelihood of adoption falls from roughly 80% to roughly
10%. When men and women disagree, then, stronger female backing for a policy
seems entirely futile.
Third, for religion, I ran separate models for Protestants and Catholics, and
Protestants and non-religious people. (Many surveys also identified Jewish
respondents, but their numbers usually were too small for their opinion estimates
to be reliable.333) In the Protestant and Catholic model, there are few cases in
which the groups’ preferences diverge by more than ten points,334 and neither
coefficient for size-weighted policy support is statistically significant.335 Not
surprisingly, Figure 1’s fourth panel paints a blurry picture too. The odds of
policy enactment barely budge as Protestant support increases from 0% to 100%,
and they decline as Catholic support varies over the same range. At least over
this small set of cases, neither denomination appears especially influential.
Nor, over a somewhat larger sample size,336 do Protestants or non-religious
people. In the model for these groups, neither coefficient for size-weighted policy
support rises to the level of statistical significance.337 Similarly, in Figure 1’s fifth
panel, the likelihood of policy adoption increases only modestly, from about 25%
to about 45%, as Protestant support rises from 0% to 100%. And the odds of
330

See id. However, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for white and Hispanic
policy support are different (p=0.45).
331
See id. Female population share is omitted from the model because it is perfectly collinear with male
population share.
332
See id. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for male and female policy support are different
(p=0.00).
333
The median survey included only 9 Jewish respondents, compared to 283 Protestants, 134 Catholics,
and 30 non-religious people.
334
Specifically, there are 46 such cases out of the 903 surveys that include information on both
Protestants’ and Catholics’ preferences. The regression results in the Appendix provide the sample size for each
model. See id.
335
See id. Predictably, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for Protestant and
Catholic policy support are different (p=0.44).
336
There are 297 cases in which Protestants’ and non-religious people’s views diverge by at least ten
points.
337
See id. Again, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for Protestant and secular
policy support are different (p=0.85).
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enactment are even less responsive to non-religious people’s views, increasing
from roughly 30% to roughly 40% as their support varies over the same range.
Lastly, I updated Gilens’s income group analysis by including surveys up to
2006 (rather than 2002).338 Like Gilens, I did not control explicitly for group size,
since each income percentile is always at the same spot in the distribution.339 And
like Gilens, I ran separate models for the tenth and ninetieth income percentiles,
and the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles.340 In the first of these models,
the coefficient for policy support at the ninetieth percentile is positive and
statistically significant, while the coefficient for policy support at the tenth
percentile is negative and significant.341 Consistent with this finding, Figure 1’s
sixth panel shows that, as support at the ninetieth percentile increases from 0% to
100%, the odds of policy enactment rise from about 10% to about 70%. But as
support at the tenth percentile varies over the same range, the likelihood falls
from roughly 50% to roughly 20%.
The results of the model for the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles are
largely equivalent. The coefficient for policy support at the ninetieth percentile
again is positive and statistically significant.342 This time, though, the coefficient
for policy support at the fiftieth percentile is negative, but just below the
threshold for statistical significance.343 In Figure 1’s seventh panel, the odds of
policy enactment increase from about 10% to about 70% as support at the
ninetieth percentile rises from 0% to 100%. But the likelihood declines from
roughly 50% to roughly 20% as support at the fiftieth percentile varies over the
same range. This chart is virtually identical to the one for the tenth and ninetieth
income percentiles.344
Gilens’s database, then, is extremely useful because it allows group power to
be assessed at the federal level, considering policy in the aggregate and
controlling for group size and type. But the federal level is not the only one in
our complicated system. It remains possible that a group that is powerless as to
national policy wields significant influence as to state policy, or vice versa. And
how a group fares as to state policy matters legally. If an overarching
determination of powerlessness is to be made for each group, taking into account
clout at each governmental level, then the states cannot be ignored.345 This is why
I turn to them next.
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See GILENS, supra note 42, at 255 (including only surveys up to 2002 in income group analysis).
See supra notes 297, 322 and accompanying text.
340
See GILENS, supra note 42, at 254-55.
341
See appx. tbl.1. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for tenth and ninetieth percentile policy
support are different (p=0.00).
342
See id.
343
See id. It is significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. Again, a Wald test confirms that the
coefficients for fiftieth and ninetieth percentile policy support are different (p=0.00).
344
In Gilens’s analogous charts, federal policy appears non-responsive rather than negatively responsive to
the preferences of the tenth and fiftieth income percentiles. See GILENS, supra note 42, at 80. The likely
explanation for the disparity is that Gilens did not hold all other variables at their means as he varied each
group’s policy support. Instead, he simply plotted predicted probability of policy change versus percent
favoring change for each group. See id.
345
See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 1: PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF FEDERAL POLICY CHANGE VERSUS
GROUP SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE
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B. State Level
In the last few years, scholars have deployed a new technique to estimate
public opinion in the states using national surveys.346 Unfortunately, this
procedure has been carried out for fewer than fifty individual issues, compared to
the more than two thousand in Gilens’s database.347 Also regrettably, the
procedure has been used primarily to determine the views of state populations in
their entirety.348 The opinions of state subgroups rarely have been calculated—
and, indeed, usually cannot be calculated because of the relatively small sample
sizes of most national surveys.349 It thus is impossible, at present, to repeat
Gilens’s analysis at the state level. The necessary data on subgroups’ preferences
by issue simply does not exist.
In the absence of issue-specific data, I obtained access to the general election
exit polls collected by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.350 These
polls are conducted in most states every two years, and they have a number of
properties that make them well-suited to the estimation of subgroups’ views.
First, their collective sample size is enormous. The 208 polls that I used for this
study, spanning the 2000-2010 period, had a total of more than 300,000
respondents.351 Second, unlike most national surveys, exit polls are designed to
have representative samples at the state level.352 Their whole point, after all, is to
appraise accurately the states’ respective political environments.
346
This technique, again, is MRP. See supra note 285; see also, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas
M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After
Shelby County, 102 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 33-37); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher
Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL.
330, 333-36 (2013).
347
See Lax & Phillips, supra note 287, at 154 (estimating state public opinion on thirty-nine issues in
largest study of its kind).
348
The procedure also has been used to determine the views of district and city populations, again in their
entirety. See Krimmel et al., supra note 284, at 6-9 (congressional districts); Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra
note 346, at 333-36 (cities and districts). But see Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 346, at 37-43 (calculating
levels of anti-black stereotyping for nonblack respondents by state and county); Christopher S. Elmendorf &
Douglas M. Spencer, After Shelby County: Getting Section 2 to Do the Work of Section 5, at 49-58 (Mar. 2014)
(calculating ideal points for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents by county).
349
Even scholars who have had access to very large national surveys typically have collapsed respondents’
individual answers into a single left-right ideological dimension. See, e.g., Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra
note 346, at 332.
350
See Exit Poll Database, supra note 44. My thanks to the Roper Center for granting me access to these
polls. I did not use primary exit polls because their respondents are representative of the primary rather than the
general electorate. And I did not use national election day exit polls because their respondents are
representative of the country as a whole, not of individual states. Moreover, the national exit poll is compiled
from respondents to the state exit polls, so using it would have meant double-counting these people.
351
Cf. Barbara Norrander & Sylvia Manzano, Minority Group Opinion in the U.S. States, 10 STATE POL.
& POL’Y Q. 446, 452 (2010) (also assembling database of more than 300,000 respondents using 1996-2006 exit
polls); Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys to Measure Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion: A Guideline
for Scholars and an Application, 11 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 430 (2011) (“State exit polls overcome the
measurement challenges of national surveys by . . . typically interviewing hundreds of state residents, regardless
of state size.”).
Norrander graciously provided me with equivalent data from the 1996-2008 period. Using it in all of my
models instead of the 2000-2010 data made essentially no substantive difference. The robustness of the results
to data from different (albeit overlapping) periods is highly encouraging.
352
See Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 453-54 (discussing elaborate procedures used to ensure
representativeness of state exit polls’ respondents). Norrander and Manzano criticize Griffin and Newman for
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Third, all of the exit polls in this period asked respondents about their
ideologies. Specifically, they posed the question, “On most political matters, do
you consider yourself: Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative?” This question is not
as fine-grained as one might like,353 but its ubiquity compensates for its
bluntness. And fourth, by probing general beliefs rather than individual policies,
the polls largely avoided the problem of preference intensity. While it is
reasonable (though not yet feasible) to weight issues by how much respondents
care about them,354 it would seem to violate basic egalitarian norms to weight
people differently based on the strength of their ideologies.
After amassing this vast pool of exit poll respondents, I computed their
average ideologies by state and then by subgroup.355 Following the lead of other
scholars, I assigned values of 1 to “Liberal” answers, 0 to “Moderate” answers,
and -1 to “Conservative” answers.356 For classifications, I used both the four that
I covered in my federal analysis (race, gender, religion, and income) and three
additional ones (age, education, and residence).357 While other works have
estimated racial and income group ideology by state,358 this is the first study to
tackle the remaining categories.
With respect to enacted policy, information does exist on each state’s laws on
a host of topics. The database compiled by Sorens, in particular, lists each state’s
policy in more than 200 areas (updated biannually to boot).359 This material is
overkill for present purposes, since equally detailed public opinion data is
unavailable. Fortunately, though, Sorens used principal components analysis to
collapse all of the individual policies into a single index of state policy
liberalism.360 Positive scores on this measure indicate state policy that is more

estimating state subgroups’ views using national surveys whose state samples likely were unrepresentative. See
id. at 452. They also argue that the disaggregation of exit poll data is superior to the application of MRP to
national surveys, due to the greater sensitivity of the former approach to differences among states. See id. at
453.
353
In contrast, the National Annenberg Election Survey used a five-point ideology scale, see GRIFFIN &
NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 42, and the American National Election Study used a seven-point scale, see Bhatti
& Erikson, supra note 324, at 228.
354
See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
355
As recommended both by scholars and by the organization conducting the polls, I incorporated the
respondents’ weights into all of my calculations. See Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 478 n.3. I also
derived subgroups’ population shares directly from the exit poll data. This means the shares represent
subgroups’ proportions of the electorate rather than the general population. See id. at 455.
356
See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 236; Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 454. These
scholars actually assigned values of -1 to “Liberal” answers and 1 to “Conservative” answers, but I reversed the
signs in order to obtain the same ideological orientation as the Sorens index of state policy liberalism.
357
Gilens’s database does not include residence data, and its age and education data is not interpretable
without access to the original surveys.
358
See supra Sections III.A, III.D (discussing relevant literature).
359
See Sorens Database, supra note 45 (covering 222 policy areas); see also Jason Sorens et al., U.S. State
and Local Public Policies in 2006: A New Database, 8 STATE POL. & POLY Q. 309, 311-17 (2008) (describing
compilation of database).
360
See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 319-23. They also created a measure of state policy urbanism,
which I do not consider further because its substantive meaning is unclear, see id. at 322, 324, and because it
correlates poorly with other scholars’ indices. In addition, I use each state’s average policy liberalism over the
entire 2000-2010 period covered by the database.
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liberal overall, while negative scores denote the opposite.361 The measure also
correlates highly with indices of aggregate state policy created by other
scholars.362 I thus felt comfortable making it the dependent variable in all of my
state-level models.
In these models, I used exactly the same specification as Flavin, Rigby and
Wright, and several other political scientists.363 That is, I interacted each
subgroup’s average ideology with its share of the population, while also
including population share separately so as to allow it to influence policy
liberalism independently.364 Unlike in my federal analysis, though, I ran a single
model for each classification rather than for each subgroup pair, and I considered
all cases rather than just those where subgroups’ ideologies diverged.365 I did so
in part for the sake of consistency with the existing literature,366 and in part to
avoid discarding valuable data. With a universe of just fifty states, validity
concerns would mount if numerous jurisdictions were excluded. The
consequence of these choices is a bias against findings of statistical significance.
As Ellis and Joseph Ura have noted, standard errors tend to be inflated when
policy models include subgroups with similar ideologies.367 Accordingly, any
significant findings that do emerge should be seen as relatively robust.
Beginning with the model for race, the coefficient for white ideology
(weighted by white population share) is positive and statistically significant. 368
This indicates that, as whites become more liberal from one state to another,
overall state policy also becomes more liberal. On the other hand, the coefficient
for black ideology (weighted by black population share) is statistically

361
See Sorens Database, supra note 45. Average scores over the 2000-2010 period range from -6.4
(Wyoming) to 12.8 (California), with a mean of 0.0 (roughly Oregon).
362
See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 320 (noting correlations of 0.81 and -0.76 with other scholars’
indices); see also Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic Representation in the American States,
1960-2012, at 18 (Aug. 24, 2014) (noting correlation of 0.84 between their index and that of Sorens et al.).
363
See supra note 324 and accompanying text (describing this specification).
364
More formally, each model I ran was an OLS regression of the form: L = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝜋𝑔1 𝜎𝑔1 ) +
𝛽2(𝜋𝑔2 𝜎𝑔2 ) + . . . + 𝛽𝑛 (𝜋𝑔𝑛 𝜎𝑔𝑛 ) + 𝛽𝑛+1 𝜎𝑔1 + 𝛽𝑛+2 𝜎𝑔2 + . . . + 𝛽2𝑛 𝜎𝑔𝑛 + 𝜀. L is a state’s overall policy
liberalism, 𝜋 is a subgroup’s average ideology, and 𝜎 is a subgroup’s share of the electorate. As in the federal
analysis, it also would be reasonable to include subgroup ideology (that is, 𝜋) separately in the model. But, as
before, the existing literature has not done so, and doing so makes little substantive difference.
365
See supra note 321 and accompanying text (describing methods used in federal analysis).
366
Notably, neither Flavin nor Rigby and Wright omitted states where different income groups’ views
were too similar. See Flavin, supra note 302, at 42; Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 208-09, 213-14. These
scholars also considered all income groups together, not in pairs.
367
See Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy
Responsiveness, 4 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 785, 790 (2008) (observing that “standard errors become inflated when
. . . correlated series are included as predictors simultaneously”); see also GILENS, supra note 42, at 253; Bhatti
& Erikson, supra note 324, at 235 (explaining that when groups’ ideologies are “more internally correlated,”
“[t]his results in higher multicollinearity and thus higher standard errors”). Because of the similar ideologies of
many of the subgroups (and because of their sheer number), I do not report Wald tests in this section.
368
See infra appx. tbl.2. As in the federal analysis, I omitted Asian Americans because their numbers were
too small for reliable ideology estimates to be produced. The median number of Asian American respondents
per state was just 48, compared to 4,673 for whites, 392 for blacks, and 136 for Hispanics. Also as in the federal
analysis, I only discuss the coefficients for size-weighted ideology because the coefficients for group size,
which represent its impact on state policy liberalism when group ideology is perfectly moderate, are not
substantively interesting. See supra note 326.
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indistinguishable from zero.369 This means that, as blacks become more liberal
from one state to another, overall state policy does not change appreciably. The
coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic ideology is positive and statistically
significant as well.370 As Hispanics become more liberal from state to state,
overall state policy does so too.
Figure 2’s first panel provides more information on responsiveness by racial
group. The chart shows how state policy liberalism changes as white ideology,
black ideology, and Hispanic ideology vary from the tenth to the ninetieth
percentiles of their respective distributions, holding all other variables at their
means.371 As white ideology shifts over this range, state policy liberalism is
highly responsive, going from about -4 (or roughly Alabama’s policy set) to
about 4 (or roughly Michigan’s). But as black ideology varies over this span,
state policy liberalism moves only from about -1 (or roughly Alaska’s policy set)
to about 1 (or roughly Ohio’s). And as Hispanic ideology goes from its tenth to
its ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism changes only from about -2 (or
roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to about 2 (or roughly Maine’s).
Second, in the model for gender, the coefficient for size-weighted male
ideology is positive and statistically significant.372 Conversely, the coefficient for
size-weighted female ideology is negative and statistically indistinguishable from
zero.373 The inference that state policy is responsive only to men’s preferences is
verified by Figure 2’s second panel. As male ideology varies from its tenth to its
ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism goes from about -5 (or roughly South
Dakota’s policy set) to about 6 (or roughly Illinois’s). But as female ideology
shifts over the same range, state policy liberalism stays almost perfectly constant
at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s policy set).
Third, in the model for religion, none of the coefficients for size-weighted
ideology rises to the level of statistical significance (though that for Protestants
comes close).374 Figure 2’s third panel confirms that state policy responsiveness
does not differ very much by denomination. The slope for Protestant ideology is
somewhat steeper than the slopes for Catholic ideology and Other Religion
ideology, which in turn are somewhat steeper than the slope for No Religion
ideology.375 But these variations in responsiveness are relatively minor—and
markedly smaller than the gaps by race and gender.
369

See infra appx. tbl.2.
See id.
371
I use ideology percentile as the x-axis here, rather than ideology itself, to avoid having to make large
numbers of out-of-sample predictions. In the federal analysis, most subgroups’ levels of support for individual
policies ranged from near 0% to near 100%. As a result, no heroic assumptions were necessary to estimate the
likelihood of policy change for all levels of policy support. Here, on the other hand, most subgroups’ ideologies
vary from state to state by at most 0.5 points on a 2-point scale. Predictions of state policy liberalism for
ideologies that subgroups never actually hold thus would be highly unreliable. Cf. GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra
note 258, at 87 (displaying predicted W-Nominate scores for racial groups’ twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth
ideology percentiles)
372
See infra appx. tbl.2.
373
See id.
374
See id. Protestant ideology is significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level.
375
In order to obtain sufficient sample sizes for all denominations, I recoded as Protestant respondents
who identified as Mormon or Other Christian, and as Other respondents who identified as Jewish or Muslim.
370
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Fourth, in the model for income, none of the coefficients for size-weighted
ideology rises to the level of statistical significance either.376 (Though that for
respondents earning more than $75,000 per year barely misses, and that for
respondents earning less than $30,000 is negative.377) In Figure 2’s fourth panel,
state policy liberalism goes from about -2 (or roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to
about 3 (or roughly Delaware’s) as the ideologies of those making more than
$75,000, or between $30,000 and $75,000, shift from their tenth to their ninetieth
percentiles. But state policy liberalism actually decreases from about 1 (or
roughly Ohio’s policy set) to about -1 (or roughly New Hampshire’s) as the
ideology of those making less than $30,000 varies over the same range.
Fifth, in what is becoming a trend, none of the coefficients in the models for
age and education rises to statistical significance.378 (Though, again, one comes
close: that for respondents with up to a high school education.379) Figure 2’s fifth
and sixth panels show that state policy is about equally responsive to the
ideologies of most age and education groups: respondents aged 18 to 29, 30 to
39, 40 to 49, and 60 and up, as well as respondents with up to a high school
education, with some college education, and with a college degree. However,
state policy seems to be negatively (though not significantly) responsive to the
ideologies of respondents aged 50 to 59, and with a postgraduate degree. These
somewhat unexpected results warrant further investigation.
Lastly, in the model for residence, the coefficients for size-weighted urban
and suburban ideology both are positive and statistically significant. In contrast,
the coefficient for size-weighted rural ideology is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Figure 2’s seventh panel supports this account of urban and suburban
influence paired with rural weakness. As urban and suburban ideologies vary
from their tenth to their ninetieth percentiles, state policy liberalism goes from
about -3 (or roughly South Carolina’s policy set) to about 3 (or roughly
Delaware’s). But as rural ideology shifts over the same range, state policy
liberalism holds steady at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s policy set).
This concludes what may have seemed, to some readers, like an unending
hail of statistics. Next, I consider what these regression results and predicted
value charts actually tell us about political powerlessness. I address their
implications for both the methodology of determining powerlessness, and the
broader substantive question of which groups should be deemed powerless.

376

See id.
See id. The ideology of respondents earning more than $75,000 per year has a p-value of .059.
378
See id.
379
See id. The ideology of respondents with up to a high school education is significant at the 10% level
but not at the 5% level.
377
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FIGURE 2: PREDICTED STATE POLICY LIBERALISM VERSUS GROUP IDEOLOGY
PERCENTILE
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C. Discussion
The most important point about the above analyses is that they demonstrate
that powerlessness, as I define it, is measurable. There exist models (and data to
insert into them) that reveal how responsive policy outcomes are to different
groups’ preferences, controlling for the groups’ size and type. And these models
(and data) do not just exist. Rather, they have been discussed extensively in the
political science literature, which has concluded that they are the proper way to
quantify policy responsiveness by group.380 As I noted earlier, the exact model
specification I used has been employed previously by Flavin, Rigby and Wright,
and several other scholars.381 All of the data I worked with also has been relied
on by prior studies of responsiveness.382
The second key point is the impressive consistency of the federal and state
analyses, both with each other and with existing work. I found that blacks are
relatively powerless at both the federal and state levels; so too have Griffin and
Newman (at the federal level).383 I also found that the poor are relatively
powerless at both the federal and state levels; again, so too have Gilens (at the
federal level) and Flavin, Rigby, and Wright (at the state level).384 And as for
classifications not yet studied by other scholars,385 my results for gender and
religion were highly compatible as well. Women are relatively powerless at both
the federal and state levels, while no religious group appears overly weak at
either level. This consistency is quite heartening. It means that powerlessness
determinations are robust to the use of completely different data from completely
different jurisdictions.
It is true that the federal and state analyses are not entirely in sync.
Hispanics, for instance, are relatively powerless at the federal level386 but not at
the state level. Similarly, the gap between the influence of the poor and that of
other income groups is more glaring at the federal level. In my view, these
inconsistencies are fairly minor, involving just a few of the models’ many
groups. It also is unclear that they are discrepancies at all. It may well be that in
the federal system, with its malapportioned Senate, filibuster, and very expensive
campaigns and lobbying, Hispanics and the poor have little clout. But they may
be more politically potent in the states, whose institutions typically are more
380
See supra note 324. In the first important work on responsiveness by income group, Bartels did not
include groups’ population shares separately in his models. See BARTELS, supra note 311, at 257-62. Bhatti and
Erikson subsequently pointed out this omission, see Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 229-30, and all later
studies have used the same specification that I employ.
381
See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
382
See GILENS, supra note 42, at 50-69 (discussing his database of group preferences and federal policy
outcomes); Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 238-40 (using exit poll data to study senators’ responsiveness);
Flavin, supra note 302, at 40-42 (using Sorens data to measure state policy outcomes); Rigby & Wright, supra
note 303, at 195, 199, 207-08, 213-14 (same).
383
See supra Section III.A.
384
See supra Section III.D.
385
These classifications, that is, have not yet been studied using an appropriate methodology. See supra
Section III.B (explaining that existing gender studies focus on representation rather than policy enactment).
386
Though, even at this level, a Wald test fails to distinguish their influence from that of whites. See supra
note 330. Hispanics thus may not be powerless at either level.
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majoritarian and less costly. Notably, my results for the poor are almost identical
substantively to those of Gilens, Flavin, and Rigby and Wright.387 This
convergence suggests that the poor’s sway does vary somewhat by governmental
level.
It also is true that the state analysis captures my notion of powerlessness less
precisely than its federal counterpart. By aggregating group preferences and
policy outcomes from the beginning, the former abstracts away the details of
individual issues. It is cruder than Gilens’s approach of using particular policies,
not whole states, as the basic unit of study.388 But, while correct, this critique
should not be overstated. Even though it is suboptimal, the state analysis satisfies
all of the criteria of a suitable methodology. It examines enacted policy, in many
areas at once, while controlling for group size and type. It also avoids the need to
adjust for preference intensity by considering ideologies in their entirety rather
than specific agenda items.389 Moreover, it is possible that Gilens’s method soon
will be feasible at the state level. Data on state publics’ issue-specific views is
proliferating, thanks to the emergence of a new estimation technique, and it
would take just a few tweaks to this technique to produce opinion figures for
state subgroups too.390 In the near future, then, state analysis may require no
sacrifice in sophistication.
A final objection relates to judicial capacity. Even if political scientists can
assess group influence accurately, how can courts possibly do so? The very idea
of judges running regression models and creating predicted value charts, in the
style of the last two Sections, is preposterous. Much less far-fetched, though, is
the notion of courts endorsing a definition of powerlessness that hinges on
empirical evidence, and then admitting expert testimony that supplies this
evidence. In fact, this is exactly how courts have tackled an array of election law
issues: how many people are harmed by a voting restriction,391 what the level of
racial polarization is in an area,392 what share of minority voters is needed so they
can elect their preferred candidate,393 and so on. Courts have never tried to
387
Like Gilens, I find a large gap in favor of the wealthy at the federal level. See GILENS, supra note 42, at
77-85. And like Flavin, Rigby, and Wright, I find that the influence of the poor is indistinguishable from zero at
the state level, while the middle-class and the wealthy wield comparable power, which is sometimes but not
always statistically significant. See Flavin, supra note 302, at 41; Rigby & Wright, supra note 303, at 207-08,
213-14.
388
See GILENS, supra note 42, at 50-69.
389
See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
390
As noted earlier, Lax and Phillips already have produced estimates of state publics’ views on thirtynine separate issues, see supra note 347, and MRP needs only a few adjustments at the poststratification stage to
generate figures for subgroups rather than populations in their entirety. If the large national surveys used by
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, see supra note 349, were paired with the revised MRP procedure, Gilens’s method
likely would become feasible at the state level.
391
This is a crucial issue whenever plaintiffs claim that a franchise restriction amounts to an
unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 9, 2014) (noting that “[s]everal experts were tasked with determining the number of registered voters who
might [be affected by Texas’s photo identification requirement]”).
392
Racial polarization in voting is one of the three preconditions for liability under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
393
Whether there is a sufficiently large minority population to elect its preferred candidate is also a
precondition for liability under Section 2. See id. at 50.
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answer these questions on their own. Instead, they have called upon experts to
assist them, and then relied heavily on their contributions. Political powerlessness
doctrine could operate in the same fashion.
Indeed, its operation would be comparatively less taxing for the judiciary. In
other fields, courts must admit, and then grapple with, expert testimony every
time that a certain claim is made. But powerlessness is not itself a cause of
action, but rather a factor that bears on a group’s suspect status. And a group’s
suspect status is fixed nationally by the Supreme Court, and then revisited only
rarely.394 It is not up for grabs in every lawsuit. Accordingly, courts would need
to evaluate a group’s influence in only a handful of extraordinary cases. In the
vast majority of equal protection litigation, courts would simply apply the type of
scrutiny entailed by a group’s preset status. The vexing empirics would be
irrelevant.
Assume, then, that my definition of powerlessness is manageable, and that
the results I presented earlier are reliable. What would be the legal implications?
Below, I go through the classifications that I covered in the federal and state
analyses: race, gender, religion, income, age, education, and residence. For each,
I comment on whether (and how) current doctrine would have to change if the
results were taken seriously. For the sake of analytical simplicity, I also equate
suspect status and powerlessness here, even though the former obviously is not
solely a function of the latter.395 I further streamline the analysis by concluding
that a group is powerless only if (1) its preferences do not have a statistically
significant impact on policy outcomes at either the federal or state levels; and (2)
the preferences of another group of the same type do have such an impact.396
Beginning with race, the legal status of blacks would not have to change at
all. Blacks are a suspect class, at present,397 and they also are relatively powerless
at both the federal and state levels. At both levels, their views have a much
smaller effect on enacted policy than those of whites.398 Sadly, decades after the
struggles of the civil rights era, blacks continue to require heightened judicial
protection. On the other hand, Hispanics’ need for such protection may be
lessening. At the federal level, the coefficient for Hispanic policy support is
indistinguishable from zero, but it also is indistinguishable from the coefficient
for white policy support.399 And at the state level, the coefficient for Hispanic
ideology is positive and statistically significant. From these figures, it is difficult
394

See supra note 208 and accompanying text (recommending that powerlessness be assessed nationally).
See supra notes 210-223 and accompanying text (explaining that it is unclear how four suspect class
criteria are meant to be analyzed).
396
Unfortunately, I am unable to comment on the classification that has attracted the most recent attention,
homosexuality, because data on gay public opinion is unavailable at either the federal or state level. I also do
not address the intersections of different groups—for example, black women or wealthy Protestants—due to
data and space constraints. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
397
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (declaring race a suspect classification).
398
For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at the federal level), see Section III.A, supra.
399
See supra notes 330, 386 (noting results of Wald test for Hispanic and white coefficients). Griffin and
Newman also find that the Hispanic-white gap with respect to congressional representation is substantially
smaller than the black-white gap. See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 87 (showing equally steep
responsiveness slopes for whites and Hispanics, in contrast to much flatter slope for blacks).
395
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to conclude that Hispanics are relatively powerless in the nation as a whole. At
worst, they are weak in Washington but more potent in the states.
Second, as to gender, the case for women’s suspect status remains
compelling.400 At both the federal and state levels, women’s opinions exert much
less influence than men’s on policy outcomes. At both levels, in fact, the gaps
between male and female clout are the largest of any groups I analyzed in
tandem. This is perhaps the study’s most surprising (and robust) finding. Despite
their large population share and the range of laws protecting them from
discrimination, women continue to be alarmingly powerless relative to men.
Third, as to religion, current law seems to treat all denominations as suspect
classes,401 but this treatment may no longer be necessary, at least for the groups
for which data is available. In both the federal and state models, no coefficient
for group preference rises to the level of statistical significance, indicating that no
denomination is particularly strong or weak. This conclusion is bolstered by the
predicted value charts, which show roughly equal slopes for all groups. However,
it is important to note that only Protestants, Catholics, non-religious people, and a
catch-all category were included in the analyses. It still is possible that smaller
sects (such as Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists) or subgroups of larger traditions
(such as evangelical and mainline Protestants) are relatively powerless.
Fourth, as to income, there is a strong (though not ironclad) argument that
courts are wrong not to deem the poor a suspect class.402 At the federal level,
rising policy support at the tenth income percentile has a negative effect on the
odds of policy enactment, suggesting a startling degree of impotence.403 At the
state level too, the coefficient for low-income ideology is negative and
indistinguishable from zero. At this level, though, the coefficient for high-income
ideology just misses statistical significance, meaning that the gulf between rich
and poor may not be quite as large. In sum, it is fair to say that the poor are
relatively powerless overall, but that their weakness may not be quite as
pronounced in the states.404
Fifth, as to age and education, courts seem to have gotten it about right. They
do not recognize any age or education group as a suspect class,405 nor should they
400

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (declaring gender a suspect classification).
See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (apparently declaring
religion a suspect classification). Almost no modern equal protection cases involve religious groups, likely
because their claims tend to be adjudicated under the First Amendment—a provision about which I express no
opinion here.
402
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to recognize
poor as suspect class). But see Ross & Li, supra note 54 (manuscript at 18-19) (noting that Court did not
squarely confront suspect status of poor in Rodriguez).
403
Like Gilens, I ran models only for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles and the fiftieth and ninetieth
percentiles in Section IV.A. Running the same model for the tenth and fiftieth percentiles produces the
following results: a positive and statistically significant coefficient for policy support at the fiftieth percentile,
and a negative coefficient significant at the 10% level for policy support at the tenth percentile. These results
are almost identical to the ones from the model for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, and they indicate that the
poor also are powerless relative to the middle-class.
404
For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at both the federal and state levels), see Section
III.D, supra.
405
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (declining to recognize elderly
as suspect class). The Supreme Court has never faced any education group’s claim to suspect status.
401
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based on the state analysis. In the age and education models, no coefficient rises
to the level of statistical significance. Similarly, in the predicted value charts, the
slopes for most age and education groups are about the same. The exceptions, as
observed earlier, are respondents aged 50 to 59 and respondents with a
postgraduate degree, whose slopes both are negative (though not significantly
so). These results require further study, but, at present, they do not justify a
verdict of powerlessness for either group.
Finally, as to residence, courts have never confronted a claim to suspect
status by any residential group. But if they were faced with such a claim by rural
inhabitants, they should be receptive to it. In the relevant state model, the
coefficient for rural ideology is indistinguishable from zero, while those for
urban and suburban ideology both are positive and statistically significant.
Likewise, in the corresponding chart, the slope for rural ideology is nearly flat,
while those for urban and suburban ideology are tilted upward. These findings
would benefit from confirmation at the federal level, but their upshot is that rural
dwellers are powerless relative to their urban and suburban neighbors.
All in all, then, current doctrine is consistent with the empirical evidence in
some areas and at odds with it in others. Figure 3 summarizes the points of
agreement and dispute. Its vertical axis shows whether or not courts deem each
group powerless (again equating suspect status and powerlessness for present
purposes), and its horizontal axis does the same for this Part’s analyses. The
upper-left and lower-right quadrants, colored in green, contain the groups as to
which the approaches converge. The doctrine and the empirics concur that blacks
and women are relatively powerless, and that whites, men, the non-poor, all age
groups, all education groups, and the non-rural are not. Conversely, the lower-left
and upper-right quadrants, colored in red, contain the groups as to which the
approaches diverge. Hispanics and religious groups are relatively powerless
according to the doctrine but not the empirics. And the poor and rural dwellers
are relatively powerless according to the empirics but not the doctrine.
Equal protection law thus would look quite—but not completely—different if
suspect status were based only on my definition of powerlessness.406 Nothing
would change for most groups, including blacks and women. But laws
discriminating against Hispanics and religious groups no longer would be subject
to more rigorous review, while laws discriminating against the poor and rural
dwellers now would be. Into which bucket each group falls, though, ultimately is
of secondary importance. The crucial point is that, under my approach,
powerlessness would be analyzed in a theoretically and empirically defensible
manner. A group would be deemed to lack sufficient influence if, and only if, its
aggregate policy preferences were less likely to be enacted than those of similarly
sized and classified groups. In the end, my proposal should rise or fall based on
the appeal of this idea—not the identities of the groups that it benefits or harms.

406
Again, this is a big if, which I am stipulating here only for the sake of analytical tractability. See supra
notes 210-223 and accompanying text (discussing how various indicia might be related to ultimate
determination of suspect status).
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FIGURE 3: POWERLESSNESS DETERMINATIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW AND
ACCORDING TO EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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CONCLUSION
I am not the first to notice the incoherence at the core of the powerlessness
doctrine. Eskridge and Schacter, among others, also have documented the many
conflicting conceptions of influence that courts have embraced at different
times.407 These scholars, though, have responded to the disorder by calling for the
doctrine’s elimination. Eskridge, for instance, has argued that, while
powerlessness “may cast light on the perseverance of prejudice and
stereotyping,” it should not be a separate criterion for suspect status.408 More
dramatically, Schacter has advocated the interment of the theory from which the
doctrine is derived in the first place. In her words, pluralism “lacks the internal
normative apparatus to answer the very question it makes central—whether a
group is sufficiently disadvantaged in the political process to warrant special
judicial solicitude.”409
What distinguishes this project from prior works, then, is that I have sought
to rebuild the powerlessness doctrine, not to reject it. I have offered a definition
of powerlessness that follows directly from pluralist theory, in that it focuses on
the likelihood that a group’s aggregate policy preferences will be enacted. I also
have shown that this definition can be operationalized using data and models that
are widely accepted by political scientists. My perspective on powerlessness thus
is markedly more optimistic than Eskridge and Schacter’s. They see the
doctrine’s failures to date and conclude that it is inherently flawed. To me, in
contrast, these shortfalls merely reveal a body of law that has not yet worked
itself pure. Pluralism does not lack the normative apparatus to determine whether
a group is powerless. The problem is just that its apparatus has not yet been put
to good use.

407
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 53, at 10-19 (tracing courts’ conflicting applications of powerlessness
doctrine); Schacter, supra note 76, at 1372-90 (same); see also supra note 79 (listing scholars who have
criticized powerlessness doctrine for its lack of clarity).
408
Eskridge, supra note 53, at 20.
409
Schacter, supra note 76, at 1369 (actually referring to Ely’s political process theory, which itself is
derived, in relevant part, from pluralism).

APPENDIX
TABLE 1: FEDERAL REGRESSION RESULTS

VARIABLES

(1)
White vs.
Black

(2)
White vs.
Hispanic

White Weighted Support

4.224***

3.226***

(0.747)

(0.731)

White Share

Black Weighted Support

-0.953

57.87

(7.480)

(49.29)

(3)
Male vs.
Female

(4)
Protestant
vs. Catholic

(5)
Protestant
vs. Secular

(6)
50th Pct. vs.
90th Pct.

(7)
10th Pct. vs.
90th Pct.

3.315***

3.404***

(0.996)

(0.543)

-5.808*
(3.483)

Black Share

-72.40
(133.8)

Hispanic Weighted Support

-0.452
(4.435)

Hispanic Share

89.03
(82.92)

Male Weighted Support

17.63***

Male Share

-324.1***

Female Weighted Support

-9.152***

(2.782)

(57.66)

(1.640)
Protestant Weighted Support

Protestant Share

Catholic Weighted Support

0.573

1.946

(6.767)

(1.476)

17.92*

-13.20

(9.236)

(10.28)

-13.39
(12.63)

Catholic Share

0.830
(33.01)

Secular Weighted Support

3.613
(7.769)

Secular Share

-36.07**
(16.36)

90th Percentile Support

50th Percentile Support

-1.468*
(0.817)

10th Percentile Support

-1.509***
(0.496)

Constant

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.365

-53.53

155.5***

-10.62

9.797

-1.845***

-1.808***

(21.58)

(44.60)

(28.05)

(10.93)

(7.524)

(0.420)

(0.267)

891

718

427

46

297

388

852

TABLE 2: STATE REGRESSION RESULTS

VARIABLES

White Weighted Ideology

(1)

(2)

(3)

Race

Gender

Religion

27.62***
(4.361)

White Share

4.084
(4.608)

Black Weighted Ideology

86.28
(57.32)

Black Share

-7.473
(6.852)

Hispanic Weighted Ideology

266.0***

Hispanic Share

-25.16**

(65.00)

(9.357)
Male Weighted Ideology

87.46***
(28.98)

Male Share

-15.83
(136.7)

Female Weighted Ideology

-0.214
(21.33)

Female Share

-61.99
(148.3)

Protestant Weighted Ideology

37.95*
(21.03)

Protestant Share

1.184
(7.372)

Catholic Weighted Ideology

60.72
(36.21)

Catholic Share

-0.271
(7.851)

Other Rel. Weighted Ideology

105.1
(97.28)

Other Rel. Share

-93.25***
(33.87)

No Rel. Weighted Ideology

26.69
(86.52)

No Rel. Share

33.69
(25.31)

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-5.473

31.48

-0.217

(4.239)

(140.8)

(1.617)

50

50

50

0.844

0.738

0.790

VARIABLES

<$30K Weighted Ideology

(4)

(5)

Income

Age

-31.87
(45.94)

<$30K Share

-17.30
(13.80)

$30-75K Weighted Ideology

40.63
(28.57)

$30-75K Share

17.79
(11.34)

>$75K Weighted Ideology

44.83*
(23.12)

>$75K Share

-26.49***
(8.861)

18-29 Weighted Ideology

26.38
(45.24)

18-29 Share

147.0
(233.5)

30-39 Weighted Ideology

99.29
(66.98)

30-39 Share

98.52
(253.7)

40-49 Weighted Ideology

78.48
(59.22)

40-49 Share

99.59
(239.1)

50-59 Weighted Ideology

-61.57
(55.89)

50-59 Share

206.8
(246.0)

60+ Weighted Ideology

55.30
(39.79)

60+ Share

117.7
(245.2)

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.00508

-138.8

(5.649)

(241.0)

50

50

0.786

0.759

VARIABLES

Up to HS Weighted Ideology

(6)

(7)

Education

Residence

108.8*
(54.08)

Up to HS Share

-21.39
(16.82)

Some Col. Weighted Ideology

50.54
(47.72)

Some Col. Share

7.191
(17.83)

Col. Grad Weighted Ideology

63.13
(65.11)

Col. Grad Share

-19.52
(20.70)

Post Grad Weighted Ideology

-46.86
(72.16)

Post Grad Share

-22.60
(19.95)

Urban Weighted Ideology

46.30***
(12.79)

Urban Share

-4.229
(4.453)

Suburban Weighted Ideology

47.61***

Suburban Share

-9.001**

(11.60)

(3.919)
Rural Weighted Ideology

7.247
(14.64)

Rural Share

7.014
(4.948)

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.900

-1.330

(1.511)

(3.119)

50

46

0.693

0.811
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